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About Voices from the borderlands 2020 
Voices from the borderlands 2020 is the flagship publication of Drugs & (dis)order, a four-year research project 
generating new evidence on how to transform illicit drug economies into peace economies. It aims to bring  
to light some of the experiences and perspectives we have been hearing in our fieldwork across seven drug-  
and conflict-affected borderlands of Afghanistan, Colombia and Myanmar. It is intended for a broad audience of 
researchers, practitioners and policymakers working on issues related to drugs, development and peacebuilding.  
The testimonies in this report offer valuable insights into how illicit drugs – and drug policies – impact the  
dynamics of violence and peace, poverty and development, and insecurity and resilience. 
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About Drugs & (dis)order
Drugs & (dis)order is a four-year research project, seeking to address 
the question, ‘How can war economies be transformed into  
peace economies?’, working in nine drug- and conflict-affected  
borderland regions of Afghanistan, Colombia and Myanmar.
A borderland perspective
The project focuses on illicit drugs, because they are one of the main commodities fuelling 
war economies. We focus on borderland regions because they have become major  
hubs in transnational drug economies and often remain conflict hotspots, even after  
national peace agreements. We thus believe that borderlands are central to the challenge  
of transforming drug-fuelled war economies into sustainable peacetime economies.
Generating a new evidence base 
There is growing recognition that drugs policies should be more pro-poor and aligned  
with the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). But the evidence base to support  
any such reform is patchy, politicised and contested. Drugs & (dis)order thus seeks  
to generate robust empirical data to help build a new evidence base. 
Engaging with the political economy of policymaking 
We do not assume that better evidence alone will transform policies. Our research also places 
policymaking under the spotlight to understand the agendas, interests and power struggles that 
shape the dynamics and outcomes of drugs, development and peacebuilding policymaking.
An interdisciplinary approach
Our research brings together insights from anthropology, sociology, geography, political 
economy, political science, history and public health to build a comprehensive picture of 
the ways that drug economies shape and are shaped by the contexts in which they are 
embedded. And we incorporate innovative research methods and analytical tools such as 
Geographic Information System (GIS) imagery to map physical changes in borderlands, 
complementing surveys, and ethnographic and life history interviews.
Building a global network of researchers
Drugs & (dis)order is led by SOAS University of London, with a team comprising 11 partner 
institutions from Afghanistan, Colombia, Myanmar and the UK. Our aim is to build a global 
network of researchers and institutions to continue this work beyond the lifetime of the project.
  www.drugs-and-disorder.org  
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There is a growing call for drugs, development and peacebuilding 
policies to be better integrated – to prioritise pro-poor development  
and align drug policy with the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). 
But much work remains to be done.1 
Drugs issues continue to be viewed primarily through 
a criminality and security lens, and development and 
peacebuilding agencies have proved reluctant to engage 
with the ‘taboo’ of drugs.2 And while those involved 
in illicit economies are among those most impacted 
by these policies, they remain poorly – if at all – 
represented in policy debates.
Voices from the borderlands 2020 seeks to bring to 
light some of these voices coming out of our fieldwork 
in seven borderland regions of Afghanistan, Colombia 
and Myanmar. Together, these three countries account 
for more than 80% of global illicit opium production 
and about 70% of global cocaine production.3 All have 
experienced years of violent conflict and are in the 
midst of some form of peace process.
The testimonies in this report offer valuable insights 
into how illicit drugs – and drug policies – shape 
the dynamics of violence and peace, poverty and 
development, and insecurity and resilience. By listening 
to marginalised voices, we believe that drug policy and 
development specialists can become more attuned 
to the ways that illicit drug economies have an impact 
on poverty alleviation, access to services, economic 
development and strategies to fight inequality and 
human insecurity, and reduce violence and harm.
Voices from the borderlands 2020 does not seek to 
provide policy recommendations, nor, at this stage 
of the project, to identify ‘what works’. Rather, we aim 
to show how the voices and findings presented here 
reveal important insights and policy implications for 
those seeking to better understand and support peace 
processes, poverty alleviation and development in 
fragile and drugs-affected contexts. 
The testimonies in this report offer 
valuable insights into how illicit drugs – 
and drug policies – shape the dynamics 
of violence and peace, poverty and 
development, and insecurity and resilience.
In the introductory chapter, we discuss what we perceive 
to be the current ‘policy impasse’ between counter-
narcotics policies, peacebuilding efforts and development 
approaches. We then outline some departure points  
as a way of moving beyond this impasse. 
The following chapters present three key messages 
that have emerged from our research with borderland 
communities in each of the three countries of study. 
Together, the voices captured in these key messages 
have enabled us to explore intersections between 
drugs, livelihoods and experiences of violence along 
the drugs value chain, ranging from drug production in 
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In Colombia, testimonies from coca growers and 
pickers across three borderland regions have given  
us a clear message: 
1. Coca growers are peasant farmers, not wealthy 
narco criminals, as is often presented in national 
and international narratives used to justify 
militarised counter-narcotic strategies. 
2. Many people in Colombia’s borderlands are 
economically better-off because of coca, but this 
comes at a high cost: coca farmers face tough 
trade-offs between the modest increase in earnings 
that enables them to invest in things like education, 
healthcare and land, and the increased violence and 
insecurity coca brings. 
3. Despite facing social, economic and political 
exclusion, Colombia’s producing communities  
are organised and active citizens. The people  
who give testimonies in this report speak proudly 
about constructing their own schools and roads,  
and organising protests or strikes.
In Afghanistan, testimonies show how: 
1. Illicit trading networks are central to households’ 
income and survival in the borderlands. At the 
same time, licit and illicit trading networks are 
intimately connected and traders and transporters 
often deal in multiple licit and illicit commodities. 
2. Legal and illegal trading networks and routes 
are extremely adaptive, responding to shifts 
in	conflict	dynamics	and	forms	of	regulation. 
Tightening border regulation and management  
has impacts on markets and trading relationships, 
which adversely affects the economic and  
social wellbeing of borderland communities. 
3. Increased	trade	flows	have	fuelled	the	 
emergence of frontier boom towns, which 
have created both economic opportunities and 
insecurity and growing inequality in borderland 
communities. This again shows how illicit 
economies generate complex costs and trade- 
offs for people, households and communities.
In Myanmar, testimonies reveal how: 
1. Rising levels of drug harm have been a 
defining	feature	of	how	borderland	populations	
have	experienced	ceasefires	and	economic	
development in Kachin State and Shan State.  
Illicit drug economies have become embedded 
in – rather than displaced by – emerging forms 
of borderland governance and the expansion of 
extractive industries and agricultural plantations.
2. Opium production is essential to the livelihoods  
of many poor households, but changing  
patterns of drug use are creating new forms  
of vulnerability and poverty. This emphasises  
the difficult trade-offs surrounding drug issues  
and the need for nuanced responses. 
3. Young people have become particularly  
vulnerable to drug-related harms in Myanmar’s 
borderlands. Together, these insights caution 
against assumptions that reducing levels of  
armed conflict, while increasing state presence  
and economic integration of marginalised regions, 
will necessarily reduce illicit drug economies  
in Myanmar’s borderlands.
In the final chapter we look across all these cases  
to reflect on the wider policy implications for  
actors working in drug policy, development and 
peacebuilding.
Transportation of transit goods to 
Pakistan by mules, Afghanistan. 
Photo by OSDR.
A closer look at the borderlands
Voices from the borderlands presents voices and perspectives from seven  
borderland regions in Colombia, Afghanistan and Myanmar. Together, these are 
three of the world’s largest illicit drug producers; all have experienced years  
of violent conflict and are in the midst of some form of peace process.
From production, to trafficking,  
to consumption
Our research across the three countries allows us to 
explore the intersections between drugs, livelihoods 














In Colombia we  
look at  production,   
talking to coca  
growers and pickers.
In Afghanistan we look  
at  trafficking,  talking  
to opium traders and  
transporters.
In Myanmar we look at  
drug  consumption,  talking 
to communities affected  
by rising levels of drug use.
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A policy impasse
The global war on drugs has not achieved its stated 
goal of a ‘drug-free world.’ In fact, there has been an 
increase in worldwide production and consumption 
of illegal drugs.4 Furthermore, the negative impacts of 
militarised counter-narcotics policies and programmes 
focusing on supply reduction in the global South,  
is widely documented.5 
It is difficult to credibly argue that the war on drugs has 
been a success, although some note that the ‘war’ has 
goals which have very little to do with drugs – such 
as winning votes, stigmatising marginal communities, 
accessing resources or strengthening the power of 
dominant groups.6 More than ever, it seems the war  
on drugs is in fact a war on people and, in particular, 
those who are on the margins.7
In light of these widely acknowledged shortcomings  
and social costs, there have been increasing calls for 
more human-centred drug policies aligned with broader 
efforts to promote wellbeing – such as the SDGs. 
There is growing recognition of the need to frame  
drugs as a development and peacebuilding issue,8  
and as a phenomenon inherent to human life,  
rather than as a security or criminal issue linked  
to a powerful moralising discourse.
Yet there remain major barriers to more integrated, 
conflict-sensitive and development-oriented drug 
policies. First, the policy fields of drugs control and 
development are divided by different – if not opposing – 
goals, metrics of success and policy instruments. 
Within the drugs control community, drugs continue  
to be treated primarily as a supply-side problem, 
pertaining to law enforcement agencies. At the same 
time, many development and peacebuilding agencies 
are reluctant to engage directly with the issue of drugs.9 
More than ever, it seems the war on  
drugs is in fact a war on people and, in 
particular, those who are on the margins.
Competing mandates and funding streams  
perpetuate knowledge silos and fragmented policies. 
These divisions are amplified by the different 
organisational cultures and approaches of drug  
and development agencies. The former tend to work 
through state-to-state partnerships and top-down 
modalities and programmes. The latter, at least 
rhetorically, stress more bottom-up, participatory 
methodologies involving civil society and the private 
sector, as well as the state. 
On the ground, in countries affected by illicit  
economies struggling to transition from war to peace, 
there is often a fundamental disconnect between 
agencies working on/against drugs, and those working 
on development and peacebuilding (or for that matter 
human security and welfare). 
Whilst these labels and mandates carry significance 
for the agencies themselves, they make no sense for 
the local communities and public officials attempting 
to grapple with the deeply interconnected challenges 
of violence, illicit economies, chronic poverty and 
community welfare on the ground. 
Second, there is major lacuna in understanding about 
how to reconcile drugs, peacebuilding and development 
policies in practice. There is very little systematic 
evidence about ‘what works’ – though there is a great 
deal of evidence about what does not work in relation  
to the war on drugs. 
This is not only an issue of breaking down knowledge 
silos and disconnects between drug agencies and 
peacebuilding and development agencies. It is also 
about asking ‘difficult questions’ about the impacts 
of drugs and counter-narcotics policies on processes 
of development and war-to-peace transitions. At the 
same time, it means confronting the tough trade-offs 
that often exist between drug policy goals, poverty 
alleviation, and efforts to reduce levels of large-scale 
armed violence.  
On the ground there is often a 
fundamental disconnect between 
agencies working on/against drugs,  
and those working on development  
and peacebuilding (or for that matter 
human security and welfare). 
Indeed, the tensions and trade-offs between 
conventional counter-narcotics and the mounting 
push for conflict-sensitive and development-oriented 
approaches manifest themselves in several ways.  
For example, the criminalisation of farmers who  
grow coca or poppy clashes with the widely  
proclaimed alternative development principle  
of participatory engagement with those involved  
in illicit crop production. 
The push for rapid results based on number of  
hectares eradicated undermines longer-term  
efforts to support alternative livelihoods. Counter-
narcotics policies linked to counterinsurgency 
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objectives may undermine government  
legitimacy in borderland regions as well as  
destroy farmers’ livelihoods. 
Moreover, attacks on specific drug ‘kingpins’ can 
destabilise political settlements and make life less 
secure by generating new forms of contestation,  
or by splintering more or less coherent organisation  
of criminal activities into a chaotic competition  
around drug turfs. 
Research from Afghanistan and Myanmar shows 
that informal political arrangements can be 
particularly important to stabilising violent conflict, 
and statebuilding in areas with long-standing drug 
economies and where the central government seeks  
to govern through – potentially uncooperative –  
regional elites.10 Yet these arrangements may be  
at odds with drug control objectives.
These examples show that the relationship between 
counter-narcotics, pro-poor development, peace  
and statebuilding objectives is neither straightforward, 
nor necessarily complementary.11
The push for rapid results based 
on number of hectares eradicated, 
undermines longer-term efforts to  
support alternative livelihoods.
This report does not seek to offer systematic  
evidence for how to address these tensions.  
However, we do provide some signposting to steer 
policymakers and practitioners towards the kinds  
of issues and approaches that are important for 
addressing trade-offs and for developing a clearer 
understanding of the uneven distribution of the costs  
and benefits of interventions. 
The Road to Muse, Shan State, Myanmar. Photo by SHAN.
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A way forward 
In light of the aforementioned ‘policy impasse,’  
new approaches are required to better understand  
and tackle illicit drug economies, especially in the 
contexts of armed conflict and peacebuilding. Here  
we outline what we believe to be a way forward,  
and give a set of departure points for the Drugs &  
(dis)order project that aim to address and help move 
beyond this policy impasse.
Engaging marginalised voices 
Drugs are the subject of multiple and contested 
narratives. But certain narratives, mainly those  
of the powerful associated with national elites and 
international donors, tend to dominate and drown  
out other more ‘marginal’ perspectives and voices. 
Participants in illicit drug economies (producers, 
transporters or consumers) across the global South  
tend to be poorly represented – or not represented  
at all – in global and national policy debates on  
drugs, development and peacebuilding. And yet,  
they are amongst those most affected by the global  
war on drugs. 
Policies that purport to address drugs, support 
development and build peace can only do so if they  
are more attuned to how drugs shape livelihoods  
and power structures in borderland regions, and the 
uneven distribution of risks and opportunities for  
those that engage in illegal drug economies. 
Hence, we believe there is a need to listen and  
learn from, in a much more serious, sustained  
and meaningful way, the voices and experiences  
of individuals and communities living in drugs- 
affected borderland regions.
A borderlands lens 
Illicit drug economies typically flourish in borderlands. 
These transnational regions are zones where drugs 
and armed conflict commonly intertwine and where 
the legitimacy of central governments is often heavily 
contested. As a result, they are politically sensitive 
spaces frequently seen as a law and order problem  
by national elites. 
We are critical of the tendency amongst  
policymakers to view borderlands as marginal, 
disconnected and ungoverned zones that need  
to be pacified, incorporated and developed. This  
state-centric perspective, which views borderlands  
as passive receptors of state policies and initiatives, 
misses the role that the margins play in constituting 
power at the centre. Indeed, far from being left  
behind or disconnected, we see borderlands  
as being places of ingenuity, innovation and 
transformation.
The Drugs & (dis)order project considers  
borderlands as a critical (and often overlooked)  
vantage point to better understand processes  
of state formation and development. Our approach 
explores how borderland regions can play an  
important role in shaping what happens in national  
and global centres. 
We aim to show how the dynamics of borderland 
regions – including illicit drug production – are less  
a consequence of their lack of political and economic 
integration, and more a function of the way these 
integrative processes are imposed, resisted and 
brokered by multiple sets of actors, interests and 
relations operating across local, national, cross- 
border and global scales.
Challenging the exceptionality of drugs 
There is a tendency amongst drug agencies to treat 
illicit drugs as though they are exceptional. This  
drugs ‘fetishism’ imbues drugs with inherent attributes 
that automatically engender crime, violent conflict  
and state fragility. 
The fetishism surrounding drugs is also reflected  
in the tendency to analyse drug-producing regions  
only through the lens of drugs. And to narrowly  
fixate on drug metrics, overlooking the broader  
socio-economic and political dynamics of which  
the drugs trade is only one part. 
In terms of research methods, this has often meant 
asking narrow and direct questions on drugs, rather 
than exploring local livelihoods and power structures, 
and how drugs interact with them. 
In terms of analysis, it has meant that the reasons  
for people’s engagement in the drug economy are  
often reduced to simplistic profit motives. Meanwhile,  
shifts in drug economies (such as changing levels  
of production) are frequently directly attributed to drug 
policy interventions, rather than to broader political  
and economic shifts.12 
The fetishism surrounding drugs is  
also reflected in the tendency to analyse 
drug-producing regions only through  
the lens of drugs.
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The Drugs & (dis)order project seeks to challenge  
such fetishism and the idea of a fixed relationship 
between drugs, armed conflict and state fragility.  
For example, we ask what makes illicit drug economies 
violent (or not)? And we question the assumption  
that eradicating drugs will necessarily end violence  
in the borderland regions we study. 
Rethinking the relationship between drugs, 
development and violence 
This fetishisation of drugs leads to drug economies 
being viewed as operating outside of conventional 
development processes. These are usually defined 
in terms of statebuilding, economic growth, poverty 
reduction, and reducing levels of armed violence. 
The framing of drugs as residual to, or undermining 
of, development processes has encouraged a distinct 
set of policy narratives. These assume greater state 
presence and economic development – and that the 
subsequent integration of drug-producing regions  
into national political structures and global markets   
will automatically work to dismantle illegal drug 
economies and enable transition to peace. 
The Drugs & (dis)order project challenges these 
assumptions. We draw upon an emerging body of 
research that reveals how drug production has at  
times been linked to periods of state expansion, as 
well as state breakdown; to efforts to stabilise armed 
conflict, as well as financing war economies; and  
has contributed to forms of welfare provision and 
economic growth, as well as being a function of 
economic marginalisation. 13 
Through integrating research on drugs, development 
and war-to-peace transitions, we aim to better 
understand how drug economies shape – and are 
shaped by – wider processes of political and economic 
change, assuming that drugs will be displaced by  
these processes.
Recognising dilemmas and trade-offs 
New approaches must begin by recognising that 
policymakers and individuals in drug-affected 
environments face tough trade-offs.
Households face trade-offs when deciding whether  
to engage in illicit economies. As illustrated in this 
report, coca-producing communities in Colombia  
have made significant socio-economic advances, 
but at the cost of enduring endemic violence. In 
Myanmar, opium cultivation has long been an essential 
component in the livelihoods of some of the country’s 
poorest communities. Yet, rising levels of harmful drug 
use are now generating new challenges for families  
and communities. 
Governments too confront complex dilemmas when 
choosing between what are often contradictory 
policy goals in the areas of counter-narcotics, pro-
poor development, peacebuilding and statebuilding. 
Rice plantation in Tangyan township, nothern Shan State, Myanmar. Photo by SHAN.
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For example, a government may satisfy demands for 
tangible short-term counter-narcotics ‘achievements’, 
but in so doing its actions may disrupt local economies, 
destabilise local power structures or renew competition 
between armed organisations involved in the drug trade.
Conversely, informal arrangements surrounding  
the drug trade (such as protection, impunity or access 
to the legal economy) may be an important foundation 
for ceasefires and political settlements between 
governments and opposition groups. This in turn  
allows for a reduction in violent conflict and  
enables the state to establish a stronger presence  
in contested areas.
Hence, the narrative of ‘win-win’ solutions is frequently 
disingenuous, dishonest and even counter-productive. 
Serious research and honest policy dialogues have  
to start with recognition of these dilemmas and  
trade-offs, as well as an understanding of the  
context that determines or influences them and  
their distributional consequences.
About Voices from the borderlands 2020
Voices from the borderlands 2020 is one of several 
Drugs & (dis)order outputs that aim to shed light  
on the experiences and perspectives of people  
involved in illicit drugs in seven borderland regions  
of Colombia, Afghanistan and Myanmar. 
It is intended for a broad audience of researchers, 
practitioners and policymakers working on issues 
related to drugs, development and peacebuilding.
Our research has revealed a cacophony  
of often discordant voices that vary  
across a range of markers of identity, 
activities, location, and so forth.
Of course, the ‘voices’ from the borderlands are neither 
homogenous nor harmonious. Rather, our research 
has revealed a cacophony of often discordant voices 
that vary across a range of markers of identity (age, 
ethnicity, gender, religion etc.); activities (licit and 
illicit, drug producers, consumers, traffickers, elite or 
subaltern); location (provincial capital, border districts, 
poor hinterlands, trafficking hubs), and so forth. 
Clearly this leads to questions about which voices to 
prioritise. Producing this publication has involved the 
curation of a vast and complex range of material. More 
broadly, the ‘production’ of ‘evidence’ is an imperfect and 
politicised process – from decisions about what ‘data’  
to collect, to how it is analysed, written about and shared. 
We believe it is important to be transparent and open 
about the nature of this process. We do not pretend 
to be totally impartial, nor do we claim to represent all 
voices. Our research does not capture the perspectives 
and experiences of people from all ethnicities, for 
example. We have struggled, particularly in Afghanistan, 
to ensure equal access to women’s and men’s voices. 
Nevertheless, we have made a conscious effort  
to highlight the narratives of ‘ordinary’ people  
such as coca farmers and pickers, cross-border 
transporters and traders, people who use drugs  
and their family members – rather than political  
and economic elites. 
In so doing, we aim to share locally grounded  
insights into the kinds of ‘peace’ and ‘development’  
that are being produced or resisted at the margins  
of the state in Afghanistan, Colombia and Myanmar,  
and the ways illicit drug economies become entangled 
with people’s everyday lives.
Our research teams in each country selected key 
messages using three main criteria. First, the  
key messages are drawn directly from the Drugs  
& (dis)order research. This involved hundreds  
of interviews conducted in 2018 and 2019. 
We aim to share locally grounded  
insights into the kinds of ‘peace’ and 
‘development’ that are being produced  
or resisted at the margins.
Second, they represent recurring issues  
emphasised by people from the borderland  
research sites. Third, these recurring issues offer,  
in our view, some surprising, counter-intuitive  
and/or policy-relevant content. Each country section 
contains further details about the key message 
selection process and the research on which the  
key messages are based. 
We hope that this publication provides an accurate, 
honest and qualitatively different representation of 
people’s lives of struggle, adversity and, occasionally, 
triumph in the borderlands.
Colombia
 The coca plant has been the economy  
[where I live] for a long time. There is no  
other plant that could replace it.  
 
Male coca farmer, Puerto Asís, October 2018
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Colombia is a regionally, environmentally and ethnically 
diverse country with a population of about 48 million  
people.14 It is ranked 79 out of 189 countries on the 
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)’s  
Human Development Index (HDI),15 and is classified 
by the World Bank as belonging to the ‘upper middle 
income’ group.16 However, Colombia is also one of the 
most unequal countries in the world.17 Ostentatious 
wealth in some of the country’s main cities contrasts 
sharply, for example, with the living conditions of  
many rural families who lack access to electricity, 
sanitation and running water.
Colombia has endured numerous periods of armed 
conflict. The most recent is often said to have begun in 
the 1960s, when various armed insurgent groups were 
formed. These include the Revolutionary Armed Forces 
of Colombia (FARC), the National Liberation Army (ELN) 
and the Popular Liberation Army (EPL). Nevertheless, 
the origins of these groups can be traced back even 
further to an era of civil war during the 1940s and  
1950 roughly (it is debated when exactly it started  
and ended) known as La Violencia and the state-led 
‘anti-communist’ military offensive that ensued.
Ostentatious wealth in some of the 
country’s main cities contrasts sharply 
with the living conditions of many rural 
families who lack access to electricity, 
sanitation and running water.
In the 1970s and 1980s, Colombian intermediaries 
started to build an illicit drug economy centred on 
cocaine exports. Around the same time, anti-subversive 
paramilitaries were proliferating across the country. 
Multiple factors led prominent narco-traffickers to join 
the war against the guerrillas, while many paramilitary 
groups, formed independently of the established 
‘narcos’, also got involved in the drug trade.
Coca cultivation expanded across Colombia in the 
1980s and 1990s, especially (but not only) in southern 
‘colonisation zones’, where people had settled after 
being pushed out of other areas by violence and/or land 
concentration. Coca cultivation offered settlers a source 
of income in areas where there was little infrastructure 
or state support for farmers, and transport costs to 
markets were prohibitively high. 
At the same time, it also helped sustain the armed 
conflict in which civilians, especially in coca-growing 
regions, have been the primary victims. In addition 
to financing illegal armed groups, the coca economy 
provoked and provided a pretext for repressive 
militarised responses, including aerial fumigations,  
with devastating consequences for local inhabitants.
The 2016 peace agreement between the Colombian 
government and the FARC was the beginning of a 
new chapter in the country’s history. What this will 
entail remains uncertain. The picture is complex: 
hundreds of social leaders and community activists 
have been killed since the signing of the agreement; 
Many farms and villages  
can only be accessed by boat.  
Puerto Asis, Colombia. Photo by  
Frances Thomson/Universidad  
Nacional de Colombia.
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the illicit crop substitution programme is faltering, and 
the ELN, paramilitary successor groups and criminal 
gangs involved in the illicit drugs trade have imposed 
themselves in many territories vacated by the FARC. 
Meanwhile, FARC dissidents (those not participating  
in the peace process) are undergoing a reorganisation. 
Whatever the uncertainties, the illicit drug economy  
and the policies aimed at addressing it, will be key  
in shaping this new phase.
Our Drugs & (dis)order team is working in various 
borderlands in Colombia, affected by the armed conflict 
and illicit drug economies. Nevertheless, for this year’s 
Voices from the borderlands 2020 publication, we focus 
on three municipalities: Puerto Asís, Santa Marta and 
Tumaco, where we concentrated our efforts during the 
first phases of our research.
Puerto Asís, Putumayo 
Puerto Asís is a municipality in Colombia’s southern 
frontier department (akin to a province or state) of 
Putumayo. It borders with six of Putumayo’s 12 other 
municipalities, and with Ecuador in the south. The latter 
border is partially defined by the Putumayo River – 
 a tributary of the Amazon and the fluvial highway of 
the region. This and other rivers are central to daily life 
in rural areas of Puerto Asís, which are comprised of 
thousands of family farms interspersed with tropical 
rainforest, many of them inaccessible by road.
Puerto Asís is home to an estimated 63,067 people, 
circa 56% of whom live in the municipal capital of the 
same name. Nearly 12% of the population self-identify 
as indigenous, and another 7% as Afro-Colombian, 
black or mulatto.18 There are at least six resguardos 
in the municipality, as well as a Peasant Reserve 
Zone. The former are indigenous territories, governed 
by indigenous cabildos under special jurisdiction, 
protected by collective and inalienable property titles. 
The latter are specially designated areas that include 
private land titles but are subject to specific rules and 
regulations, intended to promote and support the 
peasant economy.
For decades, coca cultivation has offered 
peasant farmers a way into the market 
(in some areas, it is the only viable 
commercial crop).
The mestizo population of the lower Putumayo sub-
region, in which Puerto Asís is situated, was only 
negligible until the mid-20th century. A number of 
factors stimulated accelerated settlement during this 
period. This included rural property concentration in 
nearby departments which forced many families to 
migrate in search of land. The displacement of masses 
of people during the aforementioned period of civil 
war known as La Violencia; and the wage-labour and 
commercial opportunities associated with region’s  
first oil boom were other factors.19 
The oil sector accounts for 63% of Putumayo’s Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP).20 Given that Puerto Asís is 
one of the main oil-producing municipalities in the 
department of Putumayo, oil is likely to account for a 
significant proportion of the municipal GDP also. 
But the coca/cocaine industry is equally important.  
For example, some 4,506 families from the  
municipality signed up to participate in the National 
Illicit Crop Substitution Programme (PNIS), born  
of the recent peace accords. For decades, coca 
cultivation has offered peasant farmers a way into  
the market (in some areas, it is the only viable 
commercial crop). 
It has generated comparatively well-paid rural 
employment and, as a result of the incomes it has 
created, stimulated demand for goods and services, 
thus bolstering local commerce. Nevertheless,  
these benefits have come at a huge cost.
The expansion of coca cultivations across lower 
Putumayo in the 1980s was associated with the first 
wave of narco-paramilitary violence in the region.  
The Medellín Cartel, under the leadership of Rodríguez 
Gacha, began to collaborate with state forces to  
combat insurgent groups and assassinate civilians 
accused of supporting them. 
Civilian action and battles with the guerrillas eventually led 
to the expulsion of these early narco-paramilitary groups. 
This, combined with the demobilisation of the EPL in 
1991, allowed the FARC to consolidate power in lower 
Putumayo, including over the coca economy.21 However, 
successor groups quickly emerged to take its place.
Military/paramilitary offensives in the late-1990s and 
early- to mid-2000s destabilised the FARC’s ‘hegemony’ 
in the region. The Putumayo South Block of the United 
Self-Defence Forces of Colombia (AUC) officially 
demobilised in March 2006. The AUC was an umbrella 
organisation formed in 1997 that united disparate 
paramilitary groups. 
Meanwhile, until the recent disarmament of the FARC-
EP, state forces continued to battle with the FARC.22  
The configuration of the armed conflict and coca 
economy in Puerto Asís has thus been changing since 
the 2016 peace accords (as has already been noted  
for the whole country); and the nature of this new 
scenario also remains unclear.
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Tumaco, Nariño 
Tumaco is located in the department of Nariño, to  
the southwest of Colombia. The municipality, and 
its capital of the same name, is home to Colombia’s 
second most important port on the Pacific coast. It 
borders with Ecuador to the south, the Pacific Ocean  
to the west/northwest, and other municipalities of 
Nariño to the north and east. 
As of 2019, an estimated 217,079 people resided  
in the municipality, just over half (est. 57%) in urban 
areas. The majority of Tumaco’s population is  
afro-descendent (80% of residents self-identify  
as black, mulatto or Afro-Colombian) and 55%  
of the municipal land area belongs to various  
‘black community collective territories’. 
These territories are governed by Community  
Councils (there are 16 in Tumaco), protected by special 
collective property titles, and subject to distinct rules 
and regulations under Colombian law. Another 4.6%  
of the population self-identify as indigenous and  
there are also 15 resguardos (defined above) in  
the municipality.23
Jesuit missionaries established in the area now known 
as Tumaco in the early to mid-1600s, with the aim 
of evangelising and controlling the local indigenous 
population. During the colonial era, Tumaco’s coastline 
served as a key point of exit for the gold extracted from 
the mines of neighbouring Barbacoas, and a key point  
of arrival for many of the enslaved people brought  
from Africa to work these mines. The small colonial  
port town grew significantly between the mid-19th  
and mid-20th centuries, becoming one of the main 
cities on Colombia’s Pacific coast.24 
By 2016, Tumaco had more hectares  
of coca than any other municipality  
in the country. 
Migration to the area was driven by a number of 
factors. These included the abolition of slavery in 1851 
(many freed families relocated to the coastal zone); 
the emergence of two key export-oriented economies 
in the mid- to late-1800s (these were namely latex 
rubber extraction, tapped from both the region’s natural 
forests and emerging plantations, and the gathering 
of wild tagua nuts for the production of ‘vegetable 
ivory’ buttons and other products); the construction of 
a railway line connecting Tumaco to Pasto in the late 
1920s; and finally, the arrival of numerous multinational 
timber export businesses and the associated logging 
boom between the 1940s and 1970s.25
Diverse armed actors (ELN, FARC, groups linked  
to the Cali Cartel) had moved in and out of Tumaco 
since the 1970s and 1980s. But it was not until the  
late-1990s that the municipality became a focal point  
of armed conflict. 
Around this time, the FARC established itself more 
permanently in the area, apparently with the intention 
of expanding the coca economy under its control. AUC 
Playa ‘Bocagrande’ in Tumaco, Colombia. Photo by  
Diana Machuca/Universidad Nacional de Colombia.
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paramilitary groups, specifically the newly created 
‘Liberators of the South’ Front, also took a hold in the 
area at the end of the 1990s, with the aim of combatting 
guerrillas and their alleged supporters, as well as 
controlling transit zones and the transport rung  
of the cocaine trade, in particular.26
In the years that followed, coca cultivation increased 
across the municipality. Military (counter-insurgency 
and counter-narcotics) operations in the early- and mid-
2000s contributed to the expansion of coca cultivation 
(and FARC presence) in the region. This affected the 
nearby departments of Putumayo, Meta and Caquetá. 
Coca crops, cultivators/pickers, and associated armed 
activity are said to have been ‘displaced’ from other parts 
of the country to Tumaco and Nariño, more broadly.27 
By 2016, Tumaco had more hectares of coca than  
any other municipality in the country. Some 16,658 
families from the municipality signed up to participate  
in the aforementioned PNIS in the context of the ongoing 
peace process. However, as in Puerto Asís, the future 
of Tumaco – particularly in terms of the coca economy 
and dynamics of armed conflict in the region –  
is still uncertain. 
Santa Marta, Magdalena 
The city of Santa Marta is located on the shores of  
the Caribbean Sea, in northern Colombia. It is the  
oldest city in the country (founded in 1525) and the 
capital of the department of Magdalena. The broader 
municipality, of which the city is a part, is defined by  
the Sierra Nevada of Santa Marta, a pyramidal  
mountain system. This covers most of the municipal 
territory and extends into the neighboring departments 
of La Guajira and Cesar.
As of 2019, the municipality of Santa Marta had  
an estimated 515,717 inhabitants, of whom 7.47%  
self-identify as Afro-Colombian, black or mulatto, and 
0.98% self-identify as indigenous. The vast majority  
of Santa Marta’s population is urban; only 3.2% reside  
in rural zones, but the latter still account for more  
than 90% of the municipal land area.28 
Santa Marta has important natural resources and a  
vast cultural, archaeological and historical heritage;  
one of the area’s tourist slogans boasts ‘the magic  
of having everything’. Indeed, tourism is central to  
the municipality’s economy, alongside commerce  
‘Casa de cafetero’. Sierra Nevada de Santa Marta, Colombia. Photo by Universidad Nacional de Colombia.
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and other activities surrounding the city’s port and,  
to a lesser extent, fishing and agriculture. The 
municipality as a whole is wealthier and has a more 
robust economy than Puerto Asís and Tumaco; 
nevertheless, there is a large disparity between  
the urban and rural areas.
In the mid-1970s, the Sierra became  
an epicentre for marijuana production.  
The marijuana boom or bonanza 
marimbera had significant impacts  
on the agrarian, economic and political 
structures in the region.
Our research mostly focuses on the rural areas of  
the Sierra Nevada, where multiple jurisdictions overlap. 
These include various municipalities of the three 
departments with territory in this mountain range,  
three regional environmental agencies, two natural 
parks, a forest reserve and nine indigenous resguardos 
(defined above). 
A significant number of peasants settled in the  
Sierra Nevada at the end of the 19th century. This  
was in the context of a coffee boom centred in the 
region of Santa Marta and driven mostly by foreign 
businessmen who established large estates. In the  
mid-20th century, migration to the Sierra Nevada 
intensified. Many fled to the region to escape the 
aforementioned civil war (La Violencia) that devastated 
the Andean interior of the country. Further waves  
of migrants arrived following the opening in 1971  
of the Troncal del Caribe – the most important road  
of the Caribbean region.
Around this time, in the mid-1970s, the Sierra became 
an epicentre for marijuana production. The marijuana 
boom or bonanza marimbera had significant impacts 
on the agrarian, economic and political structures 
in the region. The boom fizzled out in the following 
decade, amidst repressive state-led counter-narcotics 
campaigns and extremely aggressive aerial fumigation. 
Nonetheless, by then the northern and coastal slopes  
of the Sierra (where Santa Marta is located) had  
been consolidated both as a place of drug trafficking 
and coca production.
Different forms of organised violence – 
and in particular, paramilitary legacies – 
persist, and the region remains one of the 
country’s major drug trafficking routes.
Although paramilitary groups and diverse guerrillas 
had been competing in the 1980s, in the 1990s, local 
paramilitary groups consolidated and expanded their 
territorial control. The armed conflict intensified in  
the early-2000s with the arrival of the aforementioned 
AUC – the national paramilitary federation. After 
defeating and absorbing the local paramilitaries, the 
AUC gained significant influence over political and 
economic activities (both legal and illegal) in the Sierra 
Nevada and surrounding areas.
When we asked interviewees about the impacts of the 
recent peace process, they consistently said that armed 
conflict ended in the region more than ten years ago. 
The paramilitaries that operated in Santa Marta, and the 
Sierra more broadly, demobilised alongside other AUC 
forces in 2006. 
By this time, the government had begun implementing 
its alternative development policy in the area. This 
included the Familias Guardabosques or Forest Ranger 
Families Program, initiated in 2004, which reached circa 
1,600 families in Santa Marta. 
Henceforth, both coca cultivation and levels of violence 
in the region declined. However, different forms of 
organised violence – and in particular, paramilitary 
legacies – persist, and the region remains one of the 
country’s major drug trafficking routes.
A note on methodology 
Our key messages are drawn from three main 
sources. First, we have throughout this research project 
been in permanent dialogue with leaders of organisations 
that unite farmers from across the country cultivating 
crops used in illicit drugs. During these conversations, 
we identified a number of recurring themes reflected 
in the views of these leaders about the world of coca 
production, in particular.
Second, the key messages are based on over 150 
semi-structured and unstructured interviews with 
coca farmers and pickers from the three different 
borderlands in Colombia (Puerto Asís, Tumaco and 
Santa Marta). These were conducted by our research 
team during various fieldwork trips made between  
2018 and 2019. 
Third and finally, the messages reflect opinions and 
experiences expressed in a survey (applied June 2019) 
of peasants who are registered in the national illicit  
crop substitution programme in two of the country’s 
most important coca-producing municipalities:  
Tumaco and Puerto Asís.
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Key messages 
1.  Many people in Colombia’s borderlands are economically better-off 
because of coca but this comes at a high cost
The coca plant has been the economy [where I live] 
for a long time. There is no other plant that could 
replace it. Even when prices are low, 200 grams 
[of coca base or paste] means 300,000 pesos. It 
provides a livelihood. To make that amount with 
licit produce is very difficult. Why is it difficult? In 
my case, I would have to move plantain or yucca 
from my farm by horse and by the time I arrive at 
the roadside, with sunshine like today, they would 
be black. And then to get them from there to the 
plaza… And who would buy them? Nobody. (Male 
coca farmer, Puerto Asís, October 2018)
Coca production offers farmers a reliable 
income, creates jobs and boosts local 
economy 
Coca cultivation offers farmers guaranteed market 
access. This is in contexts of high transport costs, 
unreliable demand for legal produce and significant 
price fluctuations. It enables them to earn regular 
incomes that are slightly higher than those in other 
agrarian economies. Thus, many peasants in 
Colombia’s borderlands perceive(d) coca production as 
the only economic option (see Graph 1). 
Coca also generates substantial and comparatively 
well-paid wage employment opportunities, especially but 
not only during harvest periods. These coca incomes in 
turn bolster other sectors by increasing local demand for 
goods and services. As a result, the coca economy has 
contributed to significant socio-economic advances. 
Graph 1 – Response to survey question: Was the 
cultivation of illicit crops the only economic option for 
your family? 
Coca farmers invest their incomes in things 
like education, healthcare and land 
 
Farmers and pickers have used their coca incomes  
to improve their homes, pay for their children’s 
education and family members’ medical treatment,  
and acquire land and other assets, such as motorbikes 
and solar panels. Many would simply not have been  
able to access these services or assets were it  
not for the coca economy. In some communities, 
people also pooled their coca incomes to pay for  
the construction of schools, footpaths and roads,  
and even for teachers’ salaries.
During the coca [boom], the first thing I did with the 
first payment was to put up a roof – over half the 
house. Afterwards, we started to buy bricks and 
also, we had to buy inputs for the farm because  
that [crop] doesn’t grow alone. So, like that, I put 
up the roof on my house – half of it; afterwards 
I got the bricks, and then the things for the farm, 
and then the boys were asking to buy a television. 
(Female former coca farmer, Tumaco, February 2019)
After I had my first child, I remember we had  
coca and it was profitable. With just one harvest 
there was enough money to pay for electricity  
and a television. The television was the first thing 
one would buy, to watch the soap opera ‘Marimar’; 
then after that a little motorboat to move up and 
down the river. (Female former coca farmer, Tumaco, 
May 2018)
With money from coca, one has economy: you 
can buy a horse, improve your house – invest in 
it, like the roofing and wire fencing. […] Everything 
we have done [in this village] was with money from 
coca, between all of us, our sweat and coca money. 
When we arrived, we paid the schoolteacher for 
around two years [with our money earned with 
coca cultivation]. She was a neighbour who said 
she had studied. Later, we got a public teacher [i.e. 
designated and paid for by the state]. (Male former 
coca grower and picker, Puerto Asís, September 2019)
In my case, I am not ungrateful with coca. I have 
been in difficult situations. I have a handicapped 
brother, my mother and my little siblings [to look 
after]. When mum got sick, I had the money to buy 
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off me. [… Interviewer: and the money you paid them 
came from cultivating coca?] Yes. Why would one 
deny it? (Female former coca farmer, Puerto Asís, 
October 2018)
 [Because of the income from coca] we could watch 
television, buy gasoline, go into town, buy clothes. 
Our children had new clothes to wear whenever 
possible – every harvest, they got a new pair of 
shoes, a new pair of everything. Now [after leaving 
the coca economy], if you look at my children, they 
have repaired, patched-up shoes. Because the 
salary they pay my husband isn’t enough to buy 
shoes – if anything, maybe in December [with the 
Christmas bonus]. [… with the money from coca] 
we also bought that fridge there second-hand, the 
washing machine, the stove. (Female former coca 
grower and picker, Puerto Asís, September 2018)
Women who work in the coca economy earn 
more than in other sectors 
These socio-economic advances have benefitted both 
men and women. Women who participate in the coca 
economy earn considerably more than those who 
do not and roughly the same amount as their male 
counterparts – a relative equality not found in many 
other rural economies. 
Here, the men don’t look down on the women as 
less, nor do us women feel we are less than the 
men. We [coca] pickers are equal. (Female coca 
picker, Puerto Asís, September 2019)
[During the coca boom] I would sell lots of beer, 
aguardiente [a type of alcohol made from sugar 
cane], and those chickens for fattening – I would 
sell those. There was always money. […] I can say 
that if the economy was still like that now, I would 
never want to have a husband because I knew that 
every single weekend I would sell [a lot] and I would 
have money in my pocket for necessities, for food. 
(Female leader of a Community Council, Tumaco, 
February 2019)
The risk of violence
Tragically, coca growers and pickers (and the wider 
regions where they work) have paid dearly for these 
modest socio-economic advances. Because coca 
production is illicit, producers are vulnerable to 
assaults by illegal armed groups and by the state 
itself and have little or no access to institutional 
recourse. Graph 2 shows how the vast majority of 
survey respondents associate coca production in 
their regions with increases in violence. Nevertheless, 
nearly half of people surveyed evaluate their experience 
of participating in the coca economy as having both 
positive and negative sides (see Graph 3). 
Graph 2 – Response to survey question: Has coca 
production in the region increased violence, reduced 
violence or not had any effect on levels of violence?
 
 
It was in 1998 that coca started to arrive, when they 
[the government] removed the coca growers from 
Caquetá, they all came directly here […] But it was 
also a strategy of the FARC, they brought some 
people and they started to plant coca. We had in that 
territory of Zone 3, more or less 9,000 hectares to 
leave as reserve, as forest. And so, the colonisation 
of our territory, controlled by the FARC, began... 
The FARC told our peasants, people from the 
Community Council: ‘Plant or leave because you 
are narks’. […] Those plots [of land] were collective. 
That’s when the disaster began and not just 
in our Community Council, it extended across 
the municipality of Tumaco. (Male leader of a 
Community Council, Tumaco, September 2019)
The news of deaths, [at the hands of those] groups, 
we used to see that on television. When narco-
trafficking coca started to arrive here in Tumaco, 
then we started to see this personally, this death, 
that disappearance – all of that which was once so 
far away. (Leader of a Community Council, Tumaco, 
February 2019)
Working with coca brings problems. […] There’s 
been a lot of death here because of the coca 
cultivations. […] There are young lads who start to 
work for the narco-traffickers, and they kill them 
over any old slip-up. (Female coca farmer, Puerto 
Asís, June 2019)
The state has abandoned us and we survive with 
the coca bush because we have to. Many of us 
have become more aware, with so many deaths 
[of the problems coca brings …] If there were 
[other] opportunities, no one would work with coca 
because it’s enslaving. (Male coca farmer, Puerto 
Asís, September 2019)
 Increased 
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Graph 3 – Response to survey question: Was your 
experience with coca mainly negative, positive  
or both negative and positive in equal measure?
[During the coca boom] [...] that was another thing, 
because money kept coming in and when, well 
there were so many hectares, so when you finished 
picking in one [farm] you would return to another that 
was ready for picking again. So, there was never a 
moment that the picking stopped and that brought a 
lot of money, that stimulated the economy in the area 
a lot. But it was also too much violence and [brought 
a] lack of respect. (Female former coca farmer and 
picker, Santa Marta, March 2019)
The need for viable alternatives that 
safeguard socio-economic advances
Living daily life in a context of illegality is not easy and, 
for that reason, most coca producers would prefer to 
work in viable legal economies. The biggest challenge, 
then, is to design and implement policies that enable 
peasants to work in sustainable and licit agricultural 
economies, which safeguard the socio-economic 
advances brought by coca production but without  
all the associated risks and costs.
 Mostly positive 
 Mostly negative 





A mule outside a small village in Sierra Nevada de Santa Marta, Colombia. Photo by Universidad Nacional de Colombia.
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2.  Colombia’s coca growers are peasant farmers and do not lead the  
lives of narco criminals
A peasant coca farmer, a normal farm owner, just like 
with any other crop, gets up, [makes sure] everyone 
has breakfast, organises the pickers: ’From this 
side to this plant, you pick; from this plant to over 
there, you …’, and so on and so forth. The pickers 
collect [the leaves], harvest. The leaves are weighed 
– the pickers work until four or five [o’clock] in the 
afternoon – because the payment is by kilo. (Female 
former coca farmer, Santa Marta, March 2019)
Coca growers in Colombia are predominantly peasant 
farmers who depend on working the land for their 
livelihoods. Indeed, the vast majority of participants  
in the PNIS self-identify as campesinos (see Graph 4). 
Coca growing is not a particularly fast and 
easy way to make money 
The coca production process involves preparing the 
land, planting, weeding, fertilising and harvesting with 
family and hired labour – just like with any other crop. In 
this sense, coca production is not an especially fast and 
easy way of making money (as is sometimes suggested) 
and families who cultivate coca are no different from 
other peasant families. The major difference between 
the cultivation of coca and other crops is that the former 
offers higher earnings than the latter. 
I established a [coca] farm in alliance with a family 
member and that’s how I looked after my partner 
before the birth [of our child]. With an uncle, we 
went into sharecropping together; he had the land 
and we planted half each. But I was very attached 
to [coca] picking. It was hard for me to establish a 
coca farm because, well, it is hard work. You have 
to plant the coca, remove all the weeds around the 
bush by hand – but then you see the plant all leafy 
and lush, well looked-after, properly fumigated, and 
you feel proud. (Male coca farmer and picker, Puerto 
Asís, September 2019)
Many coca farmers also cultivate other crops
Furthermore, many coca growers also cultivate other 
crops and keep animals (such as pigs, chickens and 
cows), specifically for household consumption and 
sometimes for sale on local markets, when/where 
possible. Indeed, farmers often invest their coca 
incomes in other agricultural activities. This is part of 
a diversification strategy that helps them to reduce the 
risks associated with monocropping. 
Those who cultivated coca also had plantain, yucca, 
ñame – all those things for subsistence. (Female 
former coca grower, Santa Marta, March 2019)
Graph 4 – Response to survey question: Do you 















[My farm] is about five hectares. [I have cacao], 
peach palm, coca, a bit of everything, chiro, plantain 
– everything the land can produce. Fruit trees. All 
these things. [Interviewer: how much of your land 
is planted in coca?] Very little. [Interviewer: half 
a hectare?] Or even less. Just with that, we have 
enough to maintain the other plants. (Female coca 
grower, Tumaco, April 2019)
[In addition to coca] we also have plantain, yucca, 
maize, chickens, pigs – just for our subsistence 
though, not for commerce. (Male coca farmer,  
Puerto Asís, May 2018)
The coca economy allows for modest  
social advancements
While coca growers typically earn more than other 
peasant farmers that do not cultivate coca, their 
consumption patterns are essentially similar to those 
of other rural middle-class families. Contrary to popular 
images of ostentatious ‘narcos’, coca farmers spend 
most of their earnings on their children’s education, 
land, cars/motorbikes and homes (see Graph 5). 
The coca economy allows peasant families to access 
services and acquire assets that might otherwise be out 
of reach but it in no way makes them rich. The wealth 
generated by the cocaine industry is accumulated by 
traffickers, not coca farmers.
I haven’t seen people making these [huge] profits 
[from coca] because they have stuck with, as  
they say, the dynamic of planting just a little,  
just the essential. […] There wasn’t this mentality  
of becoming rich, simply of living comfortably.  
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There are a lot of people [who grow coca] here,  
but I haven’t met anyone who’s got money,  
who’s got wealth. It’s the traders who get rich,  
not those who cultivate. With coca, you plant  
a few bushes, fertilise twice or three times,  
and then harvest – and you end up with 200  
or 300 grams, which is enough to buy some rice. 
(Male coca farmer, Puerto Asís, October 2018)
Coca provides enough just for food and  
education […] It’s not like the government says,  
that we get rich with coca. (Male coca farmer,  
Puerto Asís, September 2019) 
 
Photo below: A typical rural farmhouse in Putumayo,  
Puerto Asis, Colombia. Photo by Frances Thomson/  
Universidad Nacional de Colombia.
Graph 5 – Response to survey question: What did you spend the income you earned from coca production on? 
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Community infrastructure (e.g. paths, roads, school) (8)
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The Colombian state treats coca peasant 
farmers as criminals 
Nevertheless, despite the fact that coca growers are 
simply peasant family farmers, the Colombian state 
treats them like criminals. Counter-narcotics policy  
in Colombia is still tied to war on drugs narratives. 
These are used to justify a war on the peasantry that 
cultivate coca. 
Over the decades, this war has involved aerial spraying 
of coca crops with a chemical cocktail (including but 
not limited to glyphosate) and militarised manual forced 
eradication. This has had devastating consequences for 
the health (in the case of the former) and livelihoods of 
coca-growing families and surrounding communities. 
So far, the Colombian government has not offered  
these peasant families viable economic alternatives  
to coca cultivation.
They didn’t just pursue big narco-traffickers. There 
was a time they would take everyone they found 
working. The got me once, as I was leaving. […]  
They stopped me, caught me with [coca] paste  
and gave me home-jail time. (Female coca farmer, 
Puerto Asís, June 2019)
When the forced eradication came, we said,  
‘Let’s plant chocolate’. Some associations,  
entities, arrived to collaborate and we planted  
with technical assistance. But as time passed,  
[the cacao crops], they didn’t work, they didn’t 
provide enough for a person, for the family, to 
subsist. […] A lot of people ended up in debt […]  
It’s not like the government says – sometimes  
they speak badly of the peasant, say that we  
are the creators of the war, [but] we are obligated  
to plant [coca] because there is no other option,  
we don’t have support. (Female coca farmer, 
Tumaco, April 2019)
They would fumigate sometimes every 15  
days in our village. […] We had a hectare and  
a half of plantain and chiro – or as it’s sometimes 
called, ‘bocadillo’. But the fumigations finished  
off our food – the maize, the yucca, everything! 
There was nothing left. We were left without  
food and the only thing we had left were a few 
corners of coca. (Male coca farmer, Puerto Asís, 
 May 2018)
What else can a peasant farmer do? The fear  
is that we will be prosecuted again. We are 
peasants and we are coca growers. […] On TV 
everything looks great, but in reality we can’t  
even support our children. We are not knee- 
deep in money, but coca has maintained us.  
(Male coca farmer, Puerto Asís, September 2019)
3.  Despite facing social, economic and political exclusion, Colombia’s 
coca producers are organised and active citizens
We organise ‘mingas’ [or collective labour initiatives, 
through the Community Action Committee] at the 
end of every month. Here we still lay logs of wood 
down to prevent them from getting too muddy. 
Participation is good. We built the school with a 
minga. […] Since we only have the river [for transport], 
coca is the only option; if the government keeps 
its promises and builds roads then there could be 
change [away] from coca… 
Here there are solar power systems that people 
purchased with whatever little bit of money they 
had left over. The oil company arrived in other 
communities and gave away solar panels, which they 
[the beneficiaries] sold cheaply […Otherwise,] there is 
no electricity; there are no public services. We wash 
with water that we get from wells using motorised 
pumps [we also purchased ourselves]. We use well 
water because the river is polluted due to the [oil] 
company and it’s more practical than going to the 
river. (Male coca grower, Puerto Asís, September 2019)
Social, economic and political exclusion 
 
Colombia’s coca growers and pickers face  
multiple forms of exclusion. One of the clearest 
manifestations of this exclusion – that also affects  
rural communities in the borderlands more generally – 
is lack of access to basic public services. Most  
families who work in the coca economy do not have 
running water, a sanitation/sewerage system, natural 
gas or internet in their homes (see Graph 6). And  
while the graph below indicates that most do have 
electricity, the figures include that which is self-
provisioned via diesel generators and solar panels. 
Other manifestations of exclusion include  
the high levels of informal land tenure and the  
deficiency of transport infrastructure, such as  
roads and bridges, in coca-producing areas.  
This makes it very difficult for peasant families  
in Colombia’s borderlands to participate in licit 
agricultural markets.  
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Graph 6 – Response to survey question: Which of the following services do you have in your home?  
There are no roads [in my area], nothing has 
changed since the 1970s or 1950s, since we started 
saying [we need roads … We have to travel by boat], 
an hour and a half to get to La Libertad. We don’t 
have to go the long way around anymore, like we 
used to, that would take about three days; now we 
go through La Libertad [… from there its] another 
hour and a half [to Puerto Asís…] by motorbike or 
car, mostly we use motorbikes [but if you] bring 
things with you, then you have to travel by ‘chiva’ [a 
type of rural bus… And within our sub-district] we 
have paths for [… moving about] on horse and by 
foot. (Male coca farmer, Puerto Asís, May 2018)
In many cases, it’s possession [people have 
possession rather than full property rights over 
their land]. In fact, even today most peasants suffer 
[because of this]. We go to present a project and 
they won’t recognise our use of the soil because we 
don’t have legal documents for the land, but instead 
deeds or [certificates] of possession or tradition – 
these are useless… 
So, people live between legality and illegality. 
And they don’t pay taxes, they don’t pay anything 
because there is no legal document. And if you 
want to go get your papers, well they ask you for 
this life and the next. You have to bring a surveyor, 
someone from the IGAC [the Augustin Codazzi 
Geographical Institute, which is in charge of the 
cadastre], you have to do this, that and the other. 
And not everyone has the money to go and do all 
those things. So, very few peasants in the Sierra 
have legal land titles. (Female former coca farmer, 
Santa Marta, March 2019)
Coca farmers and pickers have also been excluded from 
public debates (including on counter-narcotics policies), 
as many government functionaries and sectors of civil 
society do not recognise them as valid interlocutors. 
Strong agency 
Nevertheless, peasant families involved in the coca 
economy have demonstrated significant agency, in 
particular through local organisations such as the 
Community Action Committees (which have high 
levels of membership, as indicated in Graph 7) and Afro 
Community Councils. 
We have proposed alternatives, projects for food 
security, health, income. We are tired of knocking 
on doors, to ask for loans, because they ignore us. 
We are conscious of the social problems caused by 
drugs. It’s possible and we want to put our efforts 
into organic production, reforestation, ‘clean’ [or 
green] food. The forest is a rough diamond that 
can provide without the need to destroy it. We got 
disillusioned with [the idea of] carbon credits… 
They say it’s prohibited to cut down the forest, 
they impose repressive laws but they don’t give 
any incentives. Conserving the native forest is a 
[potential] alternative, but where are the funds? […] 
I have always been committed to the organisation 
of the community. The JAC [Community Action 
Committee] was formally established on the 7th 
of May 1997. We’ve done everything ‘with our own 
hands’, without any help, ‘working with our backs 
and our beasts’. (Male coca grower and community 
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At the moment, we have a Whatsapp group, just in 
case there is a project or something, and to organise 
meetings and all that. The 32 rural sub-districts 
are communicating constantly – daily it’s ‘this 
happened’, ‘there is this meeting or that meeting’… 
We are just now amidst dialogues with the Mayor’s 
Office because they have us stigmatised too – they 
said we were paramilitaries, they never stopped 
saying that […] just because we lived here – they 
always said this was a paramilitary zone, and they 
categorised us as paramilitaries. (Inhabitant of a 
former coca-producing area, Santa Marta, May 2019)
Graph 7 – Response to survey question: Do you 
belong to a Community Action Committee?
Many community members speak proudly about 
constructing their own schools and roads via  
collective labour initiatives (often called mingas) and 
using their own funds, as well as the protests and 
strikes they have organised that forced government 
functionaries to take note and sit down at the 
negotiating table. 
With coca we have done everything, with coca  
we have guaranteed for ourselves, as best we  
can, the fundamental rights that the state hasn’t 
given us. [… For example,] the issue of roads, we 
built our own roads. […] In 1997, after the strike 
in 1996, we extended the road to our sub-district 
[…] all the peasants in our sub-district started to 
contribute. We always had to organise ‘mingas’  
to go out and work… 
And that’s how it was, all the roads have been 
constructed in this way, with the support of [our] 
coca [incomes] – we all chipped in. For example, in 
our sub-district, my dad contributed 800,000 pesos 
at that time, plus the work we did on the road – 
every peasant had to give an amount of money […] 
We asked the Mayor’s Office to help us but most  
of all it has been through our own efforts, more  
than through what we got from [the] Mayor’s  
Office. (Male community leader, Puerto Asís, 
September 2018)
Presenting survey results back to coca farming communities in Tumaco, Colombia.  
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The state is not delivering many promised 
reforms and programmes aimed at 
addressing exclusion 
The National Illicit Crop Substitution Programme (PNIS), 
and the 2016 peace agreement of which it is part, were 
designed to counter the (social, economic and political) 
exclusion of peasant families, and of coca cultivators 
and pickers in particular. For example, the PNIS includes 
various spaces for participation that have permitted 
direct interaction between government functionaries and 
delegates of coca-producing rural sub-districts during the 
planning and implementation phases of the programme. 
The PNIS is also supposed to be tied to local and 
regional development plans aimed at improving rural 
infrastructure and ensuring access to public services in 
the targeted areas. However, so far the government has 
done little to advance these aspects of the PNIS. The 
government has also stalled promised legal reforms, 
which were supposed to temporarily exempt small-
scale coca farmers from criminal prosecution. 
Participants in the programme have expressed 
frustration with the government, which they claim 
has not kept its end of the agreements, despite coca 
growers and pickers keeping theirs (see Graph 8). These 
very agreements are yet another manifestation of the 
exclusion that coca growers and pickers have been 
subjected to: in open violation of the basic principles 
of citizenship, the vast majority of families who are 
participating in the crop substitution programme have 
not been given a copy of the contract they signed with 
the state (see Graph 9). 
Graph 8 – Response to survey question: Do you think the people who signed up to the PNIS will comply with the 
commitments they acquired? 
When they came here, [they said] we have to 
eradicate the coca. What did we do? We eradicated 
and that was it, because to this day, they haven’t 
given me one single [support] payment. We  
finished off with coca and we planted chocolate,  
but that chocolate isn’t generating any income  
yet. Sometimes we eat two meals [a day], 
sometimes one. (Female former coca farmer, 
Tumaco, February 2019)
The government says it is keeping its promises but 
that’s a lie. […] Both sides signed an agreement, but 
the government sent eradicators – they want us to 
live from nothing. […] It’s not that people are happy 
with coca, but we are humans [with basic needs], 
and we haven’t seen change. (Male coca farmer, 
Puerto Asís, September 2019)
Graph 9 – Response to survey question: Do you have  
a copy of the individual contract that you signed as 
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Afghanistan
 They risk their lives to provide for their  
families and smuggle drugs in the night,  
which is their only source of income.  
 
Ex-militia commander, Zaranj City, Nimroz, 2019




Afghanistan is a land-locked mountainous country with 
a population of some 38 million.29 It is classified as 
‘low income’ and ranks 168 out of 188 according to the 
HDI.30 As of 2016, an estimated 54.5% of Afghanistan’s 
population lived below the poverty line.31
Located along the historic Silk Road, Afghanistan has 
long been integrated into trans-regional networks and 
different forms of economic, religious and cultural 
exchange. Its strategic location has exposed the 
country to many military campaigns throughout its 
history, from Alexander the Great, to Persian and 
Mongol invasions, to incursions by European colonial 
powers, all of which produced lasting cultural and 
demographic footprints. Established as a buffer state 
separating the Russian and British Empires in the 19th 
century, Afghanistan gained independence in 1919, 
under King Amanullah Khan. 
The country entered a period of relative peace and 
stability from the 1930s, until the outbreak of war in 
1978. During the Cold War period, Afghan rulers pursued 
a programme of gradual modernization and political 
neutrality, securing foreign aid from both superpowers. 
This strategy reinforced the country’s long-standing 
dependence on external funding, and also reduced the 
incentive for Afghan rulers to build a fiscal and social 
contract with their population. 
State penetration and service provision were  
limited in rural areas and a growing contradiction 
emerged between a foreign-funded enclave state  
and a rural population that received few of the benefits 
of this funding. Ultimately these contradictions exploded 
in the Saur Revolution of 1978 leading to a communist 
government, wide-spread civil unrest, then the Soviet 
Union invasion in 1979 to prop up the regime. This led 
to the decade-long Soviet-Afghan War that killed and 
displaced millions of Afghans. 
The emergence of the Taliban from the 
mid-1990s brought a measure of stability 
but reinforced the country’s international 
isolation. This was to change radically  
with the US-led intervention of 2001,  
which removed the Taliban regime. 
Since then, Afghanistan has experienced different 
phases of armed conflict, interspersed with phases 
of relative stability. After the withdrawal of the Soviets 
in 1989, a regionalised civil war soon followed which 
involved the collapse of the state, the destruction of 
much of the remaining infrastructure and the integration 
of the country into an extremely volatile regional war 
economy and conflict system. 
The emergence of the Taliban from the mid-1990s 
brought a measure of stability but reinforced the 
country’s international isolation. This was to change 
radically with the US-led intervention of 2001, which 
removed the Taliban regime. 
Boarder DakMashkel way, Charbrujak district, Helmand river, Afghanistan. Photo by OSDR.
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The government that emerged following the Bonn 
Agreement, headed by President Karzai, brought initial 
hopes of a sustainable transition to peace. But instead, 
it marked a new phase of armed conflict that has 
intensified and spread over time, displacing some 3.5 
million Afghans.32 The country has been in the ‘high 
alert’ category of the Fragile States Index throughout 
the 2000s and 2010s.
Although there is a long history of poppy cultivation  
and opium use in Afghanistan, it was only during 
the war years that there was a major increase in the 
production and trafficking of opiates, and Afghanistan 
took over from Burma as the global leader in illicit 
opium production. 
The geographical distribution and aggregate production 
of opium grew steadily during the 1980s and 1990s.33 
A ban imposed by the Taliban in 2000–2001 led to a 
dramatic short-term drop in poppy cultivation. However, 
following the United States (US)-led military intervention 
and especially since the late 2000s, poppy production 
rebounded. 
Although there is a long history of poppy 
cultivation and opium use in Afghanistan, 
it was only during the war years that there 
was a major increase in the production 
and trafficking of opiates.
By 2017, opium poppy crops extended over a record 
328,000 acres or 132,737 hectares.34 And, as of  
2017, the illicit opium economy accounted for an 
estimated 20%–32% of Afghanistan’s GDP – more  
than all of the country’s licit exports of goods and 
services combined.35 In 2018, following a massive 
drought that resulted in a fall in production, the 
estimates for the illicit opium economy fell, and 
accounted for 6%–11% of GDP.36 
Following several months of negotiations and a  
short-term reduction in violence, the US government 
signed a peace agreement with the Taliban on 29 
February 2020, with the aim of bringing about a US 
withdrawal and an end to the conflict. The agreement 
includes a commitment to withdraw all US and coalition 
forces from the country by spring 2021, in exchange  
for assurances from the Taliban not to provide 
protection or material support to terrorist groups  
posing a threat to the US or its allies. 
Our research team is conducting research in  
two borderland areas of Afghanistan that were  
selected because of their contrasting historical  
and contemporary relationships with central  
state institutions and their differing experiences  
of conflict and illicit drug economies. 
The province of Nangarhar has long been a politically 
influential economic and trade hub on Afghanistan’s 
eastern border. While the remote province of Nimroz 
has had little economic and political salience in 
Afghanistan for most of its history, it is currently in  
the process of transforming into an important trade 
zone on Afghanistan’s western border. 
All two borderlands are impacted by the illicit drug 
economy and the ongoing Taliban insurgency to  
varying degrees. Our research in these three provinces 
aims to shed greater light on the relationships between 
drugs, development and violence in these borderlands, 
and how interventions by the central government  
and/or regional and international powers have  
impacted these relationships. 
Nangarhar 
Nangarhar is demarcated by the Spin Ghar mountain 
range to the south, which descend into arable lowlands 
to the north. This topography is broken in the northern-
most tip of the province by the peaks of the Hindu Kush. 
An estimated 1.5 million people live in Nangarhar;37 the 
majority are Pashtun but there are also small numbers 
of other ethnic groups such as Pashai, Arabs and Tajiks. 
The Pashtun people are themselves divided between 
lowland and highland tribes. 
A historic resort for the Afghan monarchy and other 
aristocratic elites during the winter months, the 
province has long held importance for Afghan rulers 
Diesel smuggling from Iran to Zaranj, Afghanistan.  
Photo by OSDR.
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and neighbouring powers. Today, the provincial capital 
of Jalalabad remains a key commercial, cultural and 
political hub of eastern Afghanistan.
As a key centre of resistance against the communist 
regime, Nangarhar was severely affected by the (1979–
1989) Soviet-Afghan War. Violent struggles intensified 
again in the wake of the US-led offensive from 2001 
onwards against the Taliban, which had controlled 
the province since 1994. As of 2019, the Taliban still 
has considerable influence in Nangarhar despite a 
significant number of interventions by North American 
Treaty Alliance (NATO)/US troops. The conflict scenario 
has been further complicated by the appearance 
of Islamic State (IS) or Daesh militant groups in the 
province since 2015.38
Nangarhar shares a border with Pakistan to the south 
and east and has had a thriving transit trade and 
arbitrage economy since the 1970s, built upon strong 
cross-border tribal networks. Mining (marble, talc and 
gems) and illicit logging have also been a key source 
of income and rents for provincial business elites and 
political-military groups. 
Nangarhar has a strong agricultural economy: its 
farmers grow a significant proportion of Afghanistan’s 
agricultural produce, including rice, wheat, various fruits 
and opium poppy. The province has been a major opium 
producer since the late 1980s; at certain points in time, 
it produced up to a quarter of Afghanistan’s opiates, 
with significant increases since 2010. The province has 
experienced intermittent bans on cultivation including 
prior to, during and after the Taliban regime – the 
most recent of which was implemented in territories 
controlled by the IS.
The Durrand line dividing Afghanistan from Pakistan 
has been disputed since the colonial period. On the 
one hand, the borderland it is a ‘sensitive space’ 
geopolitically, on the other there have always been close 
economic and social connections across the border, 
involving the movement of people and commodities 
across the formal and multiple informal crossing points.
As of 2019, the Taliban still has 
considerable influence in Nangarhar 
despite a significant number of 
interventions by North American  
Treaty Alliance (NATO)/US troops. 
However, post-2001, there has been a growing 
imperative from both sides of the border to regulate, 
manage and filter flows across the Durrand line,  
linked to concerns about security, terrorism, taxation 
and citizenship. Pakistan has been erecting a  
fence along the border to discourage unauthorized 
cross-border movement. As a result, several of  
the informal crossing points along the eastern  
Afghan-Pakistan border have closed in recent years, 
which has had significant impacts on the livelihoods  
of borderland communities.
Talc factory in Jalalabad, Afghanistan. Photo by OSDR.
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Nimroz 
Nimroz is largely comprised of flat desert terrain.  
It is the province with the lowest population density 
(approximately 2.8 people per km) in Afghanistan.  
As of 2015, an estimated 164,978 people lived in  
Nimroz – around a third of them in the provincial  
capital Zaranj.39 The population includes a mix  
of ethnic groups, including Baluch, Pashtun, Tajik, 
Barahawi, Uzbeks, and Hazaras. 
Although Nimroz has never been a 
stronghold for armed insurgents and has 
been comparatively less affected by the 
broader Taliban insurgency, a number of 
criminal networks and local strongmen 
wield a great deal of influence in the area.
Many of the province’s inhabitants have resided 
elsewhere at some point in their lives; a significant 
number are returnees from Iran, while others  
(especially Baluch nationalists) took refuge in Nimroz 
after being forced to leave Pakistan due to their  
political activism. A growing number of Afghans  
from other provinces have migrated to Zaranj  
in recent years, attracted by its relative security  
and burgeoning economic opportunities. 
Although Nimroz has never been a stronghold for  
armed insurgents and has been comparatively less 
affected by the broader Taliban insurgency, a number  
of criminal networks and local strongmen wield  
a great deal of influence in the area. For centuries, 
disputes over access to water have periodically flared 
up between Nimroz and neighbouring Iran, and there  
are some reports that Iran is supporting Taliban  
forces in the province.40 While the capital of Zaranj 
remains under government control, remote districts 
such as Dularam and Chakansur are increasingly 
contested by the Taliban.41 
State presence in the region has historically been very 
limited, as indicated by the paucity of public services in 
the province, which has always been one of the poorest 
in Afghanistan. The province borders Iran and Pakistan 
and the region’s inhabitants have long engaged in cross-
border trade, facilitated through Baluch networks that 
straddle the border in all three countries. 
The importance of the Nimroz Afghan-Iran border 
was accentuated following the construction of the 
Delaram-Zaranj highway in 2009 and the signing of a 
2016 trilateral transit agreement between Iran, India and 
Afghanistan. This highway is now one of Afghanistan’s 
busiest roads and a crucial trading route for licit and 
illicit commodities. 
This includes drugs produced in neighbouring  
Helmand province, which accounts for about half  
of Afghanistan’s opium production. Nimroz itself 
cultivated about 6,200 hectares of opium poppy as  
of 2017,42 much of which was planted in the last decade 
following the introduction of solar-powered deep well 
technology. In recent years, Nimroz has also become 
a people-smuggling hub for Afghans migrating to Iran, 
Turkey and Europe. 
Car station preparing for transportation 
by camel and mule in Sasobai, Nimroz, 
Afghanistan. Photo by OSDR.
A note on methodology 
The key messages for Afghanistan were drawn 
primarily from fieldwork conducted in seven districts 
of Nangarhar in autumn 2018 and in three districts of 
Nimroz in spring 2019.43 
In total, over 600 interviews with traders, transporters, 
customs officials and other key officials were collected 
in the two provinces. Fieldworkers interviewed traders 
and transporters associated with a wide variety of 
licit and illicit commodities, including opium, hashish, 
talc, fuel, fertilizer, cement, spare parts and transit 
goods. The team also interviewed members of people-
smuggling networks in Nimroz. 
In addition to the interviews, ten life histories per 
province were conducted with individuals over  
50 years old who could recall long-term changes  
in security, development and economic conditions  
of their respective borderlands. The field teams also 
made use of GIS imagery to identify research sites  
near the border prior to starting the fieldwork,  
and again during guided debriefing sessions after  
each round of fieldwork was completed. 
Read Jangul’s story
This comic tells the story of Jangul,  
a man from the Nangarhar province   
in Afghanistan. From helping his  
father in the poppy fields as a  
child, to smuggling heroin all the  
way to Moscow as an adult, opium  
has been a part of his life through  
conflict and desperation, and  
relative peace and prosperity.  
Catapult using for smuggling of Opium,  
Nimroz, Afghanistan. Photo by OSDR.
https://bit.ly/3dsBwcl
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Key messages 
1.  Illicit trading networks are central to household incomes and survival 
in Afghanistan’s borderlands
Afghanistan is not only a major producer of opium and 
heroin; it is also an important regional trading hub and 
corridor for both licit and illicit commodities. Just as 
there are many farmers that depend on growing opium 
poppy to survive, many transporters and traders also 
rely on incomes from illicit drugs for financial security. 
Such incomes help safeguard families and communities 
against economic hardship in a country that is affected 
by protracted armed conflict. 
Illicit trading has helped many families 
survive protracted crises
Our research in Nangarhar and Nimroz – on the east 
and west borderlands of Afghanistan respectively –  
points to the centrality of illicit trade in securing 
incomes of families living in extremely violent and  
risky environments. 
One farmer from Nangarhar recalled how money from 
the opium trade provided his family with a lifeline after 
being bombed during the Soviet-Afghan war: 
During the communist regime, our village was 
bombed killing nine people; one of my cousins  
was also wounded. During that bombardment, 
our house was destroyed and 15 of our cattle 
were killed. All the pots, rugs and other items 
were destroyed. When the planes finished their 
bombardment and left the area, every person  
was looking for their belongings, which were  
buried under the soil… 
My father had saved 54 seers of opium along  
with 80,000 Afghanis, which also went under the 
debris. While looking for our household goods,  
my mother found the box with 54 seers of opium 
and the cash. Our house was destroyed, but with 
this money we built a new house for ourselves. 
(Farmer, Khugyani District, Nangarhar, 2018)
As this experience shows, not everyone who 
participates in the drugs business is a wealthy  
narco-trafficker. People often become involved  
as small-scale transporters because they have  
few other choices. In Nangarhar, following the Soviet 
withdrawal and descent into civil war, transporting 
illicit drugs across international borders provided 
vital income for poor families living in dire economic 
circumstances.
In 1993, one of my friends from Achin […] used to be 
a lieutenant in the Ministry of Defense but was also 
jobless at the time. This lieutenant had a cousin 
who was trading heroin in Abdulkhel, and [my friend] 
was taking the heroin to [northern city] Mazar-e-
Sharif through one trader, and another trader helped 
transfer him to Moscow through Uzbekistan…
The lieutenant came to me and offered me a job 
helping him transport the heroin from Mazar-e-
Sharif to Moscow […] As I was living in very tough 
circumstances I didn’t have any other option. To 
make matters worse, my widowed sister and her 
children were also living with me and I already faced 
losses in my shop and I didn’t have any means to 
provide for my family. When the lieutenant offered 
me [the job], I agreed. (Former shopkeeper and  
drug transporter, Ghani Khel, Nangarhar, 2018)
The	risks	and	benefits	of	participation	in	 
the drug trade are distributed unevenly
The distribution of risks and benefits for those involved 
in the drug trade is strongly linked to their economic and 
social status. Transporters who are hired to move the 
drugs (as opposed to traders who buy and sell them) 
face particularly serious risks – something that is not 
always reflected in their pay. 
For example, the above informant crossed multiple 
borders before arriving in Moscow and received a 
relatively small sum of money in return. Still, some 
transporters may accumulate enough to modestly 
improve their economic situation, as in the case of  
the following transporter interviewed on the Iranian  
side of the Nimroz borderlands. 
With the first car that I rented I quickly wanted 
to make money. The first opportunity that I had 
I trafficked 3kg between Chabahar and Sarbaz. I 
was paid 6,000 tomans per month to do the legal 
transportation work, bringing freight from Sistan 
and Baluchistan here… 
The owner did not know I was also trafficking opium 
on the side. These 3kg became my wealth. I came 
home, delivered the drugs, and went back as quickly 
as I could. This time I went for 6kg, then 12kg, then 
24kg etc. My wealth continued accumulating. I built 
a house, I bought land. My economy started getting 
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better. I bought a car – I bought a truck and trailer 
after three years. (Drug trafficker, Sistan-Baluchestan, 
Iran, 2019)
In contrast to transporters, large-scale traders with 
access to more capital and political networks can, to 
an extent, insulate themselves from enforcement risks 
through layers of brokerage relations and pay-offs to 
top officials. These actors often use profits from drugs 
to invest in new enterprises or housing and trading 
portfolios in Jalalabad, Kabul, Tehran or Dubai. 
There are these powerful mafia families in some  
of the cities around Tehran. For example, in  
[village X], they import large quantities of opium 
and heroin, up to one tonne at a time. You can easily 
conceal this on the lorries or pick-up trucks that 
come from Sistan and Baluchistan. Once it arrives 
there, they distribute to smaller dealers, a couple  
of kg here and there... 
Meanwhile, they sit safe at home and take none of 
the risk – the risk is instead spread to the traffickers 
and to those who distribute on a smaller scale. They 
buy it from Baluchis often. They drop off the goods, 
and collect payment at a later date. This is how it 
usually works. (Drug trader, Tehran, Iran, 2019)
Illicit and licit trading networks are connected
Many traders and transporters mix and alternate 
between a variety of licit and illicit goods. In Nangarhar, 
for instance, tea, cement and fertiliser can be 
transported along the same trading corridors and 
through the same networks as hashish and opium. 
Traders build up diverse portfolios to manage risks and 
seize new opportunities as prices, regulatory systems 
and conflict dynamics shift. 
Downturns in licit activities may spur greater 
participation in drug economies. For example, in Nimroz 
individuals turned to drug trafficking during periods of 
severe drought, which affected agricultural production. 
Conversely, restrictions on talc extraction and trading in 
the Asadkhel region of Nangarhar had unforeseen knock-
on effects, including an uptick in cannabis cultivation. 
Reports that insurgent forces were benefiting from the 
talc industry led to the government crackdown, which 
negatively impacted many others, as described in this 
next testimony from a man from Achin district. 
Currently, the business of talc at Asadkhel is 
stopped, and the reason is that contracts have not 
been made with the traders […] people of Asadkhel 
say that special force officials do not allow talc 
to be transported to Shadal bazaar. They asked 
for a contract with the Ministry of Mines, but the 
contracts have been stopped by the government…
This autumn, 80% of harvesting plants [in Asadkhel] 
were cannabis. People also cultivated it in their 
houses. Most of the youth are unemployed. 
Some among them have joined the national army 
or left for Pakistan in search of work because 
the talc business, which provided employment 
opportunities to people, has stopped. (Key 
informant, Achin district, Nangarhar, 2018)
Smuggling of goods from Iran in Millak Boarder area, Afghanistan. Photo by OSDR.
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2.  Licit and illicit trade routes continually shift in response to changes  
in regulation 
The borderlands of Nangarhar and Nimroz have  
always been ‘outward-facing’, with deep historical, 
social and economic ties to neighbouring countries 
and regions. However, the hardness and porosity  
of borders have constantly changed due to  
conflict dynamics, the regulatory power of state  
and non-state authorities, and the construction  
of infrastructure, including fences, customs posts  
and border markets. 
These changes have had significant impacts on  
illicit flows of legal and illegal goods, with knock-on  
effects on the economic and social wellbeing of 
borderland communities. For example, hardening the 
border may increase price differences and the security 
premium on goods crossing the border, boosting 
incentives for smuggling. Changing border controls 
also creates more opportunities for powerful elites  
to profit by imposing informal taxes on illicit flows. 
Border regulation, security and livelihoods
There are significant trade-offs between border 
security and borderland livelihoods. Iran and  
Pakistan have tightened their respective borders  
with Afghanistan, with Pakistan building a fence  
along its border with Nangarhar and Iran building  
a wall and ditch across the Iranian-Nimroz border.  
This has had significant consequences for local 
economies based on cross-border trade and 
connections. One ex-militia commander from  
Nimroz who had lived on both sides of the border 
described the negative impact of the wall on the 
livelihoods of young people in Nimroz, prompting  
many to turn to drug trafficking.
It has been eight years since the Iranians built 
a wall along the border and closed it. When this 
border was open, young people were busy trading 
and transporting business goods, but currently 
there are no work opportunities and youths can’t 
go for work to Iran as the Iranian government 
demands a passport and a valid visa to enter  
their country. So, they risk their lives to provide 
for their families and smuggle drugs in the night, 
which is their only source of income. The border 
police force young people to pay them money  
and the police search their houses and arrest  
them if they refuse to pay. (Ex-militia commander, 
Zaranj City, Nimroz, 2019)
In Nangarhar, a former customs officer talked about 
the changing regulatory arrangements at the Torkham 
border crossing and the different kinds of trade going 
on, captured in the next testimony.
In the past, the Torkham gate was sometimes 
open and sometimes closed for trade goods to 
be transferred across the border on both sides […] 
Currently it is closed for all of the tax-exempted 
goods that were traded over it in the past. Some  
of the transporters carry small bags of trade goods 
in their hands or on their backs to transfer them 
over the Torkham border…There are some children 
who used to carry these goods in their hands 
to Pakistan. (Former customs official, Torkham, 
Nangarhar, 2018)
Traders and transporters often adapt to border closures 
in creative and dynamic ways. Restrictions in formal 
crossings and the establishment of walls and fences 
have prompted the development of informal crossings 
in remote areas in both Nangarhar and Nimroz. 
The Sasobi border crossing in Dur Baba district of 
Nangarhar is a prime example of a small-scale route 
that has grown more prominent as other major crossing 
points have become more restricted. Difficult to 
traverse by car, most goods are carried by mules or 
camels, which transport tax-exempted goods, narcotics, 
and other items over the border into Pakistan. In 
Nimroz, some small-scale drug traffickers have opted 
for a rather different method to export their product: 
catapulting it over the Iranian border wall. 
I have an Iranian business partner and my cousins 
and other relatives are living in [X] village located 
on the other side of the border. It is so hard to do 
this business unless you have a business partner 
in Iran as I can’t go to Iran myself. We have contact 
numbers of the Iranian police who are guarding in 
the border and my business partner in Iran contacts 
the border police guarding in the check posts and 
border on the Iran side to set the perfect time with 
them for smuggling out opium… 
The police call my partner to tell him the time, my 
partner calls me and I take the opium to the border 
where the Iranian border police open the gates built 
in the wall and I cross the border wall to hand over 
the opium to my business partner on the other side 
of the wall/border. Sometimes, we use a ladder 
to climb the wall and hand over the opium to my 
partner on the other side of the wall without letting 
the Iranian border police know about it… 
The youths from our villages are cooperating with me 
while I am transporting the opium from the village 
to the border point. Smugglers also cooperate with 
each other and don’t take money for it. (Transporter, 
Zaranj City, Nimroz 2019)
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Trust, brokerage and violence 
Borderlands are ‘trading spaces’ in which social 
relations, local institutions and regulatory arrangements 
have adapted to the management and movement 
of flows. This has involved developing a complex 
infrastructure of logistics, transportation and 
warehousing; sophisticated systems for monitoring  
and responding to market information; organisations  
for managing and regulating labour; and financial 
systems that enable the flows of credit and capital. 
All of these arrangements have been ‘stress tested’ 
and adapted to operating in a high-risk (and high 
opportunity) environment in which there are multiple 
sources of ‘friction’ linked to a fragmented geographical, 
political and social landscape.
In order for Afghanistan’s borderland trading systems  
to function, three things are key – trust, brokerage  
and violence. Trust underpins and ties together the 
networks that are necessary to move commodities 
through space and across borders. 
Brokers are required to straddle the synapses and 
boundaries that divide social, political and economic 
systems and that create friction impeding the free 
flow of trade. These figures may mediate between 
government officials and the Taliban, or between  
Iranian and Afghan customs officers, or between 
human trafficking networks in Kabul and the provinces. 
They are both the connective tissue and the point  
of friction in trading systems. 
During the last years of communist regime, my 
uncle with whom I was doing opium trade got killed 
in a mine explosion in Bahar village along with 
12 other men when he was travelling to Pakistan 
to participate in a Jirga […] My uncle had a lot 
of experience in opium trade and he had lots of 
contacts with people but I had not enough assets 
myself. Moreover, I could not continue in the opium 
trade without the reference of my uncle, therefore,  
I left the opium trade. (Trader, Nangarhar, 2018)
Violence is central to the regulation of both licit  
and illicit trade, given the absence of credible legal 
mechanisms to enforce contracts and mediate 
disputes. Endemic and unpredictable violence  
shifts incentives towards high-value, easily 
transportable and concealed commodities such  
as drugs. Geographically concentrated violence  
leads to a shift in the direction of trade flows. 
Violence may be linked to the control of trade routes 
and the renegotiation of political settlements among 
local elites around the distribution of the proceeds 
of trade. Voices from Afghanistan’s borderlands 
challenge the commonly held idea that the drugs trade 
is exceptionally violent – they indicate that all trading 
networks function in the shadow of violence; coercion 
or the threat of coercion are central to the functioning 
and regulation of trade. 
Vehicles which carry goods belonging to warlords 
cannot be stopped by anyone at any point. 
Whatever goods they carry, whether illegal or  
legal, no one can stop them. Also no one can  
search them as all of the security forces know 
about it in advance. Most often, such vehicles  
carry illegal goods or banned goods to transfer 
across the border to Pakistan. The anti-narcotics 
officers in the district don’t have the ability  
to stop it. (Civil servant, Nangarhar, 2018)
Trading networks are subject to informal revenue 
collection at ‘choke points’, often dominated by state 
and/or non-state elites and violent armed groups. 
Evidence from Nangarhar and Nimroz suggests that 
these choke points exist along international border 
crossings, as well as along informal borders that 
exist between government and opposition-controlled 
territories. Local government employees, particularly 
army officers and customs officials, were frequently 
identified as key brokers in illicit trading networks, 
imposing informal taxes on the trading of illicit goods  
in exchange for facilitating trade.
Small-scale traders and transporters are vulnerable to 
exploitation and violence at the hands of government 
and opposition forces alike. This was particularly 
the case for transporters moving goods between 
Nangarhar and Pakistan, where traders reported being 
threatened and abused by local authorities, and even 
being coerced into transporting illicit goods.
Two years ago I unloaded the truck in the Ring Road 
area of Peshawar and then parked the truck to get 
loaded with cement. Two Pakistani police came to 
me and told me that their boss wanted to talk to me. 
They took me to their boss and made me sit on a 
chair. Their boss asked me why I was doing hashish 
business…
I said that I don’t know anything about hashish. 
They imprisoned me and made a case against me 
that I had 6kg of hashish. I spent four months in the 
prison and then I paid Rs. 50,000 to get released. I 
lost Rs. 200,000 during these four months and I still 
owe people Rs. 150,000. The Pakistani government 
was very cruel. (Cement transporter, Sherzad district, 
Nangarhar, 2018)
Opposition forces also act as important trade brokers  
in both provinces. Although the Taliban taxes traders 
and transporters informally, they often play a helpful 
role in providing additional security for transporters 
operating in remote areas.
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I drive to Dak once or twice a week and I see Taliban 
there, but they don’t cause trouble to ordinary 
people and they help the public by preventing 
thieves and providing security. (Transporter and 
people smuggler, Zaranj City, Nimroz, 2019)
However, many traders in Nangarhar described a 
culture of fear precipitated by the Taliban and other non-
government armed groups operating in their areas. In 
Ghani Khel district of Nangahar, traders reported being 
harassed by three different armed groups operating 
in the area, often threatening them with murder and 
kidnapping if they refused payment:
I receive calls from different phone numbers asking 
me for money, but I don’t know if they are Taliban or 
thieves. I haven’t paid them any money yet,  
but I am scared to get killed by the Taliban…local 
police are sometimes coming to my shop as well 
and they are asking for food and money, and  
I give them Rs. 3,000-4,000. I don’t know whom  
to complain to as government employees and 
Taliban are both thieves […] security is at its  
worst, every trader has armed guards for keeping  
himself and his property safe. (Trader, Ghani Khel, 
Nangarhar, 2018)
We don’t know what party to pay money to. It is a 
bad situation and we don’t know enemy from friend. 
We go home early in the evening, we are not even 
safe in our houses and we guard our homes during 
the night. (Trader, Ghani Khel, Nangarhar, 2018)
3.  Increased trade flows have had positive and negative impacts  
for people living in frontier boom towns 
Frontier boom towns emerge in border regions  
where trade flows converge. These places become 
magnets for traders, migrants, state officials and 
speculators, with the promise of new opportunities, 
windfall profits and tax revenues. 
The fortunes of these towns wax and wane according to a 
number of factors, including shifts in regional geopolitical 
contexts, changes in the prices and availability of 
commodities, attempts to regulate trade, and conflict. 
Boom towns are often linked with a ‘twin’ settlement 
across the border, which develop a symbiotic and 
mutually reinforcing relationship: for example, 
Jalalabad-Peshawar on the Afghan-Pakistan border 
in Nangarhar, and Zaranj-Charbarhar straddling the 
Iranian-Afghan border in Nimroz.
Boom towns are places of opportunity, 
investment and rapid growth
Ziranj, the capital of Nimroz province, emerged as one 
such boom town following the fall of the Taliban in 
2001. Over the past two decades, processes of rapid 
accumulation linked to licit and illicit trade have been 
accompanied by significant investments in housing  
and public services in the city. 
Store or BATAY for transit goods, Nangahar, Afghanistan. Photo by OSDR.
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The wider province has also benefited from increased 
trade links among India, Iran and Afghanistan, which 
has led to more domestic and international investment 
in roads and other infrastructure in the region. 
Many positive changes have been made to the lives 
of people and they have become more educated 
[since 2001]. My life has also changed, my daughter 
is a teacher and she is getting paid, I have a salary 
as well […] We currently have access to facilities 
such as telephone, internet and televisions, we 
always use them and update ourselves about what 
is happening in the world and it is a positive change 
in our lives. (Education manager, Kang District, 
Nimroz, 2019)
As regional trade links in Nimroz have deepened, 
revenues from illicit drugs in the post-2001 era have 
also contributed to private investment, resulting in  
the expansion of economic and social opportunities.
The residents of Zaranj city have become wealthier 
as some are involved in narcotics, some have 
opened shops in the city, and some have jobs in 
government […] During the Karzai regime, my sales 
went higher as there were more development 
programmes, construction, and people were buying 
more electrical materials from my shop. I was 
making a good profit that made my life better  
and I extended my business and investment. 
(Electrician and trader, Kang District, Nimroz, 2019)
The growth of frontier boom towns comes 
with costs and trade-offs
The rapid expansion of these towns has been 
accompanied by considerable trade-offs for people 
living in the area and for the wider economy. Boom 
towns may be unruly and insecure places, where control 
of trade depends on access to the means of violence. In 
Nimroz, a new class of elites profiting from trade flows 
have gradually grown in power, associated with large-
scale corruption, land seizures and rising inequality. 
The wealthy people in Nimroz province are living 
in Zaranj city and the majority of these people are 
Jihadi commanders, government officials, landlords 
and drug traders. (Education manager, Kang District, 
Nimroz, 2019)
The value of land in Zaranj city has risen as the city 
has been mapped and government officials who 
usurped land have sold it at high costs […] Drug 
traders and government officials involved in this 
business have also become wealthy but the poor 
people are getting poorer by the day. (Ex-militia 
commander, Zaranj City, Nimroz, 2019)
While Nimroz has been a hub for the trafficking  
of drugs (into neighbouring Iran) cultivated in  
other southern Afghanistan provinces for decades,  
people-smuggling has grown in prominence over 
the last decade, attracting new types of smuggling 
networks from outside of the province. 
In Nangarhar, Torkham has been a significant frontier 
town for decades, with its fortunes closely tied to  
the economy of neighbouring Peshawar. Trade has  
been the lifeblood of the local economy – boosting 
government revenues, providing a source of investment 
and supporting the livelihoods and welfare of the 
borderland population. 
But the benefits are not equally distributed. Just as 
a small elite have gained from the trading boom in 
Nimroz, in Nangarhar a handful of well-positioned 
political players have profited from contracts linked  
to the military logistic pipeline supplying NATO  
forces that crosses through Torkham. Furthermore, 
small-scale licit and illicit trades are associated  
with high levels of violence, poor working conditions 
and exploitative working practices.
While the emergence of frontier boom towns may 
provide economic benefits to inhabitants, the wealth 
accumulated through trade is often transitory and 
ephemeral, with many elites investing profits in capital 
cities or outside of the country. 
Additionally, the trade-offs associated with life  
in frontier boom towns may prove costly in the  
long run by damaging public legitimacy, prompting 
greater support for opposition forces. In Nimroz, 
borderland communities tended to be satisfied with  
the increase in investment and infrastructure from  
the central government. However, they had little  
to say that was positive about what they perceived  
to be corrupt elites, as well as rapidly growing inequality 
at the provincial level.
Our expectations from the central government  
have changed…Since he [Pres. Ghani] planned to 
build Kamal Khan Dam, the residents of Nimroz 
are very happy […]We don’t expect much from the 
provincial government as they are all corrupted  
and their priority is their own benefit. (Trader,  
Zaranj City, Nimroz, 2019)
One reason for the growing Taliban insurgency is 
corruption in the government [...] they are involved 
in bribery and they interfere in everything […] 
that dissatisfies the poor people and caused the 
Taliban insurgency to grow. (Transporter and people 
smuggler, Zaranj City, Nimroz, 2019)
Myanmar
 After the ceasefire […] road construction started,  
then the logging started. The heroin started coming  
in when the area became more populated. […] Many  
young people passed away because of drugs.  
 
Elderly resident, Chipwi, northeast Kachin State, 2018




Myanmar is the largest country in mainland Southeast 
Asia with a population of about 53 million people.44 It 
shares extensive borders with Bangladesh, India, the 
Peoples Republic of China (incorporating Tibet), Laos 
and Thailand. Although the country has vast natural 
resources, most of the population is extremely poor. 
The country is ranked 145 out of 188 in the HDI – but 
there is considerable variation in living standards 
between affluent modern urban centres and the most 
impoverished rural areas.45 
Myanmar – formerly Burma46 – is defined by its ethnic 
diversity, although the Bamar, the country’s largest 
population group, dominates.47 Ever since independence 
from British colonial rule in 1948, successive regimes 
have attempted to obtain more unified control over the 
country. Battles over ethnic identity, as well as political 
ideology, have been central features of Myanmar’s  
post-colonial history. 
Violent conflicts have persisted to this 
day, despite various attempts at peace 
negotiations, including current efforts to 
secure a nationwide ceasefire agreement.
This project focuses on Kachin State and Shan State 
in the north and northeast of the country. Elites from 
both states were signatories to a pre-independence 
document called the Panglong Agreement.48 This 
expressed aspirations for a federal political system  
with significant local autonomy. These aspirations 
unravelled after independence and both regions 
descended into armed conflict between various ethnic 
armed organisations and the national government. 
Violent conflicts have persisted to this day, despite 
various attempts at peace negotiations, including 
current efforts to secure a nationwide ceasefire 
agreement. However, underlying political grievances 
have remained largely unaddressed and periods of 
fragile stability have often given way to new cycles  
of violence and mistrust. 
Myanmar’s current peace process aims to build upon 
ceasefire arrangements that were agreed with various 
ethnic armed organisations in the late-1980s and 1990s. 
These ceasefires were designed partly to enable the 
country’s borderlands – particularly regions bordering 
China and Thailand – to become more firmly integrated 
into the national economy. 
Political and business elites within Myanmar and  
across Southeast Asia re-imagined these conflict-
affected borderlands as resource-rich, untapped 
‘wastelands’ targeted for large-scale resource 
extraction, trade, and infrastructure corridors.  
National development discourses blame armed  
conflict on underdevelopment, and claim that 
development will bring peace.
However, the top-down approach to borderland 
development has resulted in predatory business 
investments, environmentally and socially destructive 
Opium Farm in Tamu Khong village, Chipwi Township,  
Kachin State, Myanmar. Photo by KRC.
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practices, and new rounds of militarisation that have 
concentrated wealth and power in the hands of a narrow 
clique of military and business elites. 
The upland areas of Kachin and Shan  
are perfectly suited to the cultivation 
of opium poppy, which has provided 
livelihood security in impoverished rural 
areas but also became a financial pillar  
to sustain armed conflict.
To date, there remains a still poorly formulated future 
vision of what ‘development’ might look like in these 
areas, and in many ways this time of ‘transition’ has 
also seen considerable reversals and retrenchments. 
This is despite the emergence of a post-2010 quasi-
democratic political system, the launching of a formal 
peace process in 2011, and Aung San Suu Kyi’s 2015 
election victory.
Numerous factors have favoured the persistence of 
violent conflict in Myanmar. In Kachin and Shan states, 
armed organisations can find recruits in most villages –  
sometimes by force but often due to a sense of 
obligation towards a shared ethno-nationalist struggle. 
These groups also benefit from the relative lack of 
‘distance destroying’ infrastructure that might enable 
the national military to gain control (roads, railways and 
so on), as well as proximity to borders and cross-border 
economic and political networks. 
Local communities are some of those 
must vulnerable to the harms related  
to changing patterns of drug use, including 
increasing levels of heroin injecting  
and methamphetamine use.
Furthermore, the upland areas of Kachin and Shan 
are perfectly suited to the cultivation of opium poppy, 
which has provided livelihood security in impoverished 
rural areas but also became a financial pillar to sustain 
armed conflict.
In recent decades, the relationship between drugs and 
conflict has become more complex. The issue has 
extended beyond opium cultivation to the manufacture 
and supply of other drugs, such as methamphetamines. 
Local communities are some of those must vulnerable 
to the harms related to changing patterns of drug use, 
including increasing levels of heroin – injecting and 
methamphetamine use. 
Paradoxically and importantly, many believe drug-
related harms to be the outcome of failed and politically 
insincere ceasefire agreements and increasing state 
presence, rather than rooted in armed conflict. National 
political and economic policies, they say, have focused 
on pacifying recalcitrant local populations instead of 
ensuring inclusive and sustainable development. Of 
course, many at the national level would question this. 
Regardless of whether these views are ‘right’ or ‘wrong’, 
they have become strong explanatory narratives, which 
deserve exploration and understanding. This is one of 
the purposes of our research and of the Voices from the 
borderlands publication(s).
Shan State
Shan State is the largest of Myanmar’s 14 administrative 
divisions, covering almost a quarter of the country. 
Much of its 60,000 square miles comprise steep forest-
covered hills and deep valleys with a few elevated 
plains known as the Shan Plateau. Shan State shares 
long international borders with China and Thailand and 
a short border with Laos. Its estimated population of 
six million inhabitants are of many different ethnicities 
and languages. 
This diverse population is spread across 55 townships, 
almost 16,000 villages and a number of small cities –  
Taunggyi in the south, Lashio in the north and 
Kengtung in the east. However, the vast majority of 
people live in rural areas and agriculture is the main 
livelihood. Following decades of armed conflict and 
underinvestment in basic services and infrastructure, 
Shan State remains poor with many rural households 
suffering food insecurity. 
Used syringe in northern Shan State, Myanmar. 
Photo by SHAN.
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During pre-colonial times, the region was made up  
of multiple self-governing principalities, which endured 
under the colonial system of indirect rule through  
which the British governed the region. 
Through the 1950s, the newly independent Myanmar 
state dismantled these long-standing local power 
structures as part of its efforts to consolidate 
and centralise control but was unable to establish 
functioning institutions to replace the systems it 
removed. Social, political and economic grievances  
were aggravated by a shift to assertive Bamar 
militarism, further eroding the legitimacy of the  
central government. 
Armed resistance, which began in the late 1950s, 
grew rapidly after General Ne Win’s 1962 military coup 
established an authoritarian state. Armed conflict 
across Shan State has been highly fragmented with 
multiple different armed groups and conflict fault-lines. 
The region’s opium economy became an important 
source of finance for many armed groups.49 
During the 1990s and 2000s, a series of ceasefire 
agreements, which often included informal 
arrangements around the drug trade, created  
a fragile stability throughout much of northern and 
eastern Shan State. In contrast, large areas of southern 
and central Shan State experienced violent counter-
insurgency campaigns.50 
In recent years, these dynamics have been reversed: 
northern Shan State has experienced renewed 
outbreaks of violence, while the largest armed group 
in southern Shan State has signed the government’s 
nationwide ceasefire agreement. Yet even during 
periods of ‘ceasefire’, borderland populations have 
continued to endure multiple forms of violence  
linked to continued localised conflicts, militarisation  
and dispossession.
Since the 1990s, northern Shan State 
has become Myanmar’s most important 
overland trade corridor, linking Mandalay 
to the China border.
The central government has asserted militarised  
and direct forms of control over certain areas of  
Shan State with strategic and economic importance, 
notably major border crossings and sites of large-scale 
development projects. In other areas, it has resorted 
to a more indirect approach to borderland governance, 
including the negotiation of ceasefires and the creation 
of army-backed militias.51 This has created mosaics  
of power, shaped by diverse sets of actors, interests  
and political and economic networks – local, national 
and international.
Since the 1990s, northern Shan State has become 
Myanmar’s most important overland trade corridor, 
linking Mandalay to the China border.52 Vast revenues 
have also been generated through logging, mining, 
agribusiness (large-scale land concessions are primarily 
for corn, rubber and fruit plantations), hydropower dams 
and other infrastructural projects, such as the oil and 
gas pipelines linking Yunnan in China with deep-sea 
ports on Myanmar’s western seaboard. 
Myanmar-China border crossing, Shan State, Myanmar. Photo by SHAN.
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Many of these ventures are part of broader initiatives 
to deepen economic integration between China and 
Southeast Asia.53 The China-Myanmar Economic 
Corridor, which forms an important part of China’s  
Belt and Road Initiative, will follow a similar route 
to the afore  mentioned pipelines. These ambitious 
development plans are being mapped onto areas  
of unresolved armed conflict.
Vast revenues also continue to be generated from the 
drug trade. Shan State produces more than 90% of 
Myanmar’s opium, which is mainly cultivated in steep 
upland areas and has provided an important livelihood 
for an estimated 200,000–300,000 households. Much 
of this opium is converted to morphine base or heroin 
within Myanmar’s borders and then sent to China. 
China became the main market for Myanmar’s opium 
following rising heroin use in the 1990s and 2000s.54 
Over the last couple of decades, Shan State has 
also become one of the world’s largest producers of 
methamphetamine pills, known colloquially as ‘yama’  
or ‘yaba’,55 and more recently crystal meth or ‘ice’.56  
The growth of methamphetamine production in 
Myanmar is closely linked to a rise in production and 
consumption of the drug in neighbouring Thailand. 
In 2003, the Thai prime minister Thaksin Shinawatra 
proclaimed a war on drugs, which provided further 
incentive to move production across the border  
into Myanmar.
As echoed in the testimonies presented below,  
many inhabitants of Shan State indicate that harmful 
drug use and associated social problems are growing  
in their communities and see the current peace  
process as an opportunity to begin addressing  
these issues. However, the embeddedness of drugs  
in Shan State’s economy and its power structures  
make this far from straightforward. 
Kachin State
Kachin State is Myanmar’s most northerly state and 
shares borders Yunnan and the Tibet Autonomous 
Region of China, as well as India’s north east states 
of Assam and Arunachal Pradesh. According to 2014 
census data, Kachin State has a population of circa  
1.7 million people. 
However, the census was a controversial exercise 
and large areas of the state, which are still not under 
Myanmar government control, were excluded from  
the enumeration. Not all of those who live in Kachin 
State identify as Kachin and the region has experienced 
extensive in-migration from other parts of Myanmar 
in recent years. It is an ethnically, linguistically and 
culturally very diverse state, although the collective  
of communities who identify as Kachin lay claim  
to this region as their ancestral homeland. 
According to the World Bank’s multi-dimensional 
poverty index, Kachin State’s capital, Myitkyina, is 
relatively prosperous even when compared to other 
major urban centres around the country. Meanwhile, 
rural areas, especially in the far north of the country, 
remain extremely impoverished. Myitkyina’s relative 
prosperity is partially a result of its strategic location  
at the northern-most point of the Irrawaddy River  
and its connections to historical trans-regional  
trading routes – from China and Thailand to the  
east and India to the west – and an associated  
in-migration of businesses from lower Burma,  
China and elsewhere. 
The underdevelopment of the region  
is related to its marginalisation from  
the political centre.
However, the band of economic growth around 
Myitkyina is very narrow: the railway infrastructure 
stops at Myitkyina and the roads beyond to the north 
and west become poor or non-existent a few miles 
outside the city. Most importantly, locally owned small 
and medium industries are almost entirely absent.  
This is despite the natural wealth of the region, including 
extensive forest exploited for timber, jadeite, gold and 
other precious metals. 
The underdevelopment of the region is related to 
its marginalisation from the political centre. Armed 
conflicts have been both a cause and an effect of this 
marginalisation. Significant challenges to the legitimacy 
of the Myanmar government commenced with the 
founding of the Kachin Independence Army (KIA) in 
1961. By 1963, the region was in widespread revolt. 
Conflict was almost continuous for the next 30 years, 
with occasional hiatus when political settlements were 
sought and failed. 
Until the 1980s, the most significant confrontations 
were linked to the triangular conflict between the 
Myanmar army, the Communist Party of Burma (CPB), 
which was backed extensively by China, and the KIA. In 
areas at the edges of KIA authority, other ethnic armed 
organisations also emerged, as well as smaller militia 
groups such as the New Democratic Army – Kachin 
(NDA-K). Many of these armed organisations have been 
implicated in the region’s opium economy, although 
the KIA later shifted to suppression of opium poppy 
cultivation as it sought international support.
In 1994, the Kachin Independence Organisation 
(KIO) (of which the KIA is the military wing) and the 
Myanmar army signed a ceasefire agreement. This led 
to 17 years of armed peace and widespread hope for 
a better future. It also facilitated a dramatic increase 
in logging and mining, which caused considerable 
environmental desecration,57 and large agri-business 
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developments (especially rubber and banana 
plantations), which relied on dispossessing local 
villagers of their land. 
In addition, many inhabitants believe the ceasefire led 
to an upsurge in harms caused by drug use. These 
issues help explain the KIO’s return to conflict against 
an increasingly assertive Myanmar army in 2011.58 
This was a time when inhabitants elsewhere in the 
country were building hopes around a national political 
transition. Kachin State was largely excluded from 
related opportunities, such as the surge in aid flows 
to the country from 2015 onwards, since international 
actors would mostly only work with and through 
Myanmar government agencies. 
This context has made it very difficult for Kachin  
people to make their voices heard, nationally and 
internationally, especially in relation to their experiences 
of drug harms. This is something we hope to address 
through this report.
A note on methodology
The key messages presented below draw upon the 
findings from more than 600 interviews conducted by 
the research team across Kachin State and Shan State 
in 2018 and 2019. 
Both Shan State and Kachin State are regions of 
significant ethnic and linguistic diversity. Beyond this 
territorial definition of ‘Kachin’ and ‘Shan’, however, 
this project works with organisations who self-identify 
as being of Kachin and Shan ethnicity (which are 
themselves complex identity labels). This necessarily 
creates opportunities, as well as constraints, in relation 
to how much the research team can carry out research 
that cuts across the multiple linguistic and ethnic 
dynamics of these two quite vast areas. 
The majority of research conducted by the team has 
been with Shan-identifying and Kachin-identifying 
populations. Although some interviews have also been 
conducted with non-Shan/Kachin and non-Shan/Kachin-
speaking populations, it is important to emphasise 
that the research presented here primarily focuses on 
revealing the perspectives held by Shan and Kachin-
identifying populations within these broad territorial units. 
In light of how little research has been conducted on 
these issues from these perspectives, this does, however, 
represent a significant contribution to knowledge. 
The field research has primarily focused on interviewing 
people who do not self-identify, and who are not 
identified by others as being political elites, either civil 
or military. Some respondents may have roles that 
are clearly politicised or where limited local political 
authority may be attached to their role. But the 
research offers in every case a more locally grounded 
set of critical insights into the kinds of ‘peace’ and 
‘development’ that are actually materialising in the 
country’s borderlands and the ways in which drugs have 
become entangled in people’s everyday lives. 
There is a wide array of important insights emerging 
from this research which we cannot cover in the space 
available in this report. Instead, we have focused on 
highlighting insights that recurred frequently in the 
interviews, resonated strongly in follow-up workshops 
with research participants and local audiences, and 
which the research team view as important in engaging 
with wider audiences on drug issues in Myanmar. 
Jade miners injecting heroin in Phakant, Kachin State, Myanmar. Photo by KRC.
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Key messages 
1.  Rising levels of drug harm is a defining feature of how people have 
experienced ceasefires and economic development in Kachin State 
and Shan State
Policymakers often suggest that the key to addressing 
illicit drug economies lies in reducing levels of armed 
conflict, strengthening the state and integrating 
economically and politically ‘marginalised’ regions.  
This policy narrative is based on the idea that 
peacebuilding, statebuilding, economic development 
and counter-narcotics strategies are mutually 
reinforcing. However, the perspectives of borderland 
populations in Myanmar frequently challenge  
these assumptions. 
Although ceasefire agreements helped to reduce levels 
of outright armed conflict in many areas, they left 
populations vulnerable to the ‘slow violence’ of drug 
misuse. Indeed, people from across Kachin and Shan 
express concern that drug-related harms have grown 
in the wake of the ceasefires and associated economic 
development. This is echoed in the reflections of two 
elderly men on how their hometown of Chipwi, in 
northeast Kachin State, changed after the signing  
of the KIA ceasefire in 1994.
When I settled down in Chipwi in 1973, I heard that 
there was opium available but I had never seen 
it with my own eyes. That time, I did not come 
across drug addicts. I had not heard about heroin 
and yaba in the area. After the ceasefire, the Asia 
World Company came into the area, then road 
construction started, then the logging started in 
the area. The heroin started coming in when the 
area became more populated. Then the local youth 
started using different kinds of drugs. Many young 
people started shooting heroin. Many young people 
passed away because of drugs. (Elderly resident, 
Chipwi, northeast Kachin State, 2018)
Since the ceasefire period the Chinese came in, 
people could move around more easily, and drugs 
started flooding in. Yes, the ceasefire was a good 
thing but since the ceasefire, drugs became more 
available. I see it that way. In the past, opium  
was meant only for elderly people. My uncle  
on my father’s side used opium for 50 years [...] 
Now young people use drugs in different ways – 
injecting, inhaling. Just last night a young man  
died of his drug addiction in this village. I am 
planning to go to the funeral. He was just 30  
years old. (Elderly resident, Chipwi, northeast  
Kachin State, 2018)
People across Shan State also made associations 
between the ceasefires and an apparent growth in  
illicit drug production and consumption in their area. 
This is reflected in the account that follows of how  
the situation changed under the Pa-O ceasefire in 
southern Shan State.
In the past, there were a few poppy plantations in 
some of the villages around Taunggyi, in Pinlaung 
and Hsihseng. However, the ceasefire deals allowed 
the ceasefire and militia groups to control certain 
territories […] Since these regions are under their 
control, poppy plantations and drugs were allowed 
without any restrictions. Since taxes are imposed 
on the local farmers for their crops and land, people 
would grow poppies since they can earn more 
money more quickly compared to other regular 
crops. Then the spread of drugs also increased. 
(Local politician, Taunggyi, Shan State, 2019)
Mining (for gold, amber, rare earths and other minerals), 
logging, and large-scale agribusiness operations 
expanded across northern Myanmar from the 1990s 
onwards. The association between these forms of 
economic development and worsening drug harms was 
a common theme in many interviews. The reflections  
of a young man working in the amber mines in Danai 
– a resource-rich and conflict-affected town in the 
western part of Kachin State – capture this clearly. 
In the amber mines, many miners used drugs. I 
started using drug since the nature of work in the 
mine was so tiresome. When I inhaled the drug I 
became so energetic. I used heroin, yaba and the 
like. It depended on how much money I made. Over 
time I saw more and more amber miners become 
drug addicts. Here many people perished due to 
drug use. Here it is difficult to get opium. But heroin 
and yaba can be found easily. Many miners ruined 
their lives due to the nature of the mining work. 
(Miner, Danai Township, Kachin State, 2018) 
The link between drugs and extractive industries is 
not new: problematic drug use had long existed in the 
infamous Hpakant jade mines in Kachin State. However, 
extractive industries expanded significantly in Kachin 
State over the last few decades due to the stability 
created by the ceasefires and the country opening up 
for trade and investment. 
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This led to improved road connections, the  
emergence of various boom towns and a surge  
in cash circulation, which in turn facilitated and 
contributed to more widespread drug use. A resident 
of a village along the Irrawaddy River in Myitkyina 
Township offered his observations on the links  
between drugs and development.
In the past there were some drug users in the 
village. But it became worse when government 
allowed Chinese businessmen to do gold mining 
along the riverbank. They spread drugs as they 
wished to. They employed villagers as daily 
labourers. At that time, the pay was just 500 kyats 
per day. Only after working for ten days we could 
earn 5,000 kyats. It wasn’t much… 
But the new gold businesses gave per month 
60,000 kyats […] They worked along the riverbank 
with machines. If they did not use big machines we 
could still do small-scale gold sluicing. But they 
just took away whatever they could manage to 
with their machines. They worked here until 2006 
and destroyed everything. They did destroy not 
just the environment and land; they also destroyed 
the village community […] So many young people 
started working, and opium was offered for free. 
(Local resident, Myitkyina Township, 2018)
Whereas people in Kachin State see heroin use 
as the primary cause of concern, the majority of 
people interviewed throughout Shan State saw 
methamphetamines (‘yaba’) as the most pressing 
drug issue in their communities. People say that yaba 
gives users more energy and resilience to work long 
hours in exhausting jobs. Methamphetamine use has 
consequently become deeply embedded in working 
culture in manual and low-skilled sectors, as shown 
by the reflections of one lady interviewed in Hsipaw, 
northern Shan State. 
My husband always uses drugs when he goes  
to work. The boss said if they [the workers]  
use drugs they can work really hard. When I’ve  
gone to sell the oranges, the dealers sell pills like 
it’s a normal market. Everybody can buy them 
easily. (Farmer, Hsipaw Township, northern Shan 
State, 2018)
People who sell drugs target wage labourers because 
they have expendable income. A number of interviewees 
also stated that business owners in the mining, logging 
and agricultural plantation sectors encourage and 
facilitate drug use amongst their employees so that 
they can work harder and for longer. This is shown by a 
Christian pastor’s comments that follow about drug use 
in Kengtung Township, eastern Shan State.
Drug rehabilitation centre, Phakant, Kachin State, Myanmar. Photo by KRC.
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The owners of the plantations hire workers to tend 
their crops by paying both money and yaba. If 
this wasn’t happening, there would only be a few 
workers who would want to work for them, and the 
workload of tending the crops would not be finished 
on time. So, what the employers do is they put yaba 
in the cans of soft drinks and treat their workers 
with those soft drinks. Now, the workers do not dare 
take the soft drinks and water from the plantation’s 
owner, they bring their own water. (Christian pastor, 
Kengtung Township, eastern Shan State, 2019)
Many other testimonies highlight how business owners 
provide drugs as a way to attract and retain workers in 
light of growing levels of drug dependency. One worker 
in Loilem Township, southern Shan State offered his 
reflections on this practice and its impact on workers’ 
families in the testimony that follows.
The owner of the mining business gave yaba  
pills to the stone workers, saying the drugs can 
make them stronger and healthier. In this way,  
those workers became addicted to drugs. This is 
the beginning of drug-related problems amongst 
the families of those workers. Sometimes they 
cannot even hire workers if they cannot provide 
them with drugs…
In the beginning, the workers are provided with one 
or two pills, but later when they become addicted, 
they buy the drugs with all the money they make 
each day, leaving their families unprovided for. 
(Miner, Loilem Township, southern Shan State, 2018)
The link between drugs and the security and authority 
structures that have accompanied wider economic 
changes and growing state presence in borderland 
regions under the ceasefires is also important. This will 
be dealt with more fully in later outputs from our project.
Army-backed militias (typically called pyithusit which 
translates as ‘people’s militias’) have been deployed as 
counter-insurgency forces to police local populations 
and secure sites for economic development. In return, 
these militias have unofficial permission to run legal 
and illegal enterprises. This link between drugs and 
militias is captured in the following testimony of a man 
in his sixties reflecting on the changes he witnessed in 
eastern Shan State over the past 20 years.
Businessmen could produce drugs freely because 
of ‘pyithusit’ [people’s militias]. They produce in 
areas under control of ‘pyithusit’, but ‘pyithusit’ is 
backed by the army […] The militia has its people 
and their families and they want to develop their 
area, so they have to earn money. That’s why they 
cooperated with businessmen. We say that drug 
traffickers can ‘pass through’ militia. They pay taxes 
to militia so the militia protects them [...] From my 
point of view, as long as there are militia groups, 
drugs cannot disappear. (Resident of Tachiliek, 
eastern Shan State, 2019)
A 48-year-old mother also reflected on how drug use 
has impacted her village in Lashio Township, a militia-
controlled area of northern Shan State.
The militia group holds everything in our village. 
There are plenty of people who become rich 
because of selling drugs. Some sell amphetamine 
and construct a big house. I have five sons. Most 
of them went to China. The one who has bad legs 
is left at home. Because we fear they will become 
addicts, my sons and many villagers go to work in 
China. They will become drug users if they stay in 
the village. The government never comes to arrest 
the people who use drugs and the sellers. (Farmer, 
Lashio Township, northern Shan State, 2018) 
These brief testimonies provide important insights 
into people’s everyday experiences of economic 
‘development’ and political authority in the 1990s and 
2000s under the ceasefires. They demonstrate the 
need for sensitivity in our understanding of the ways 
in which ceasefires are perceived at a popular level 
across Kachin State and Shan State, and how these 
perceptions shape civil society discussions about 
potential solutions to the harms caused by drugs and 
the perceived barriers to realising those changes. 
Used syringe collection point at a harm reduction  
site in Phakant, Myanmar. Photo by KRC.
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2.  Opium production is essential to the livelihoods of many poor 
households. But changing patterns of drug use are creating new  
forms of vulnerability and poverty 
Much of the focus of the international community 
working on drug issues in Myanmar continues to be on 
stemming opiate production and trafficking to foreign 
markets. However, many communities throughout 
Myanmar’s borderlands view rising rates of harmful 
heroin and methamphetamine use as a more pressing 
issue than levels of opium cultivation. 
Populations in poppy-growing areas often associate 
opium with various positive impacts. Opium poppy 
cultivation provides a reliable source of income and thus 
improved food security. It also generates cash to pay 
for services such as education and health. And opium 
itself is used for the treatment of various ailments. In 
contrast, populations throughout Kachin State and Shan 
State view rising heroin and methamphetamine use 
as having a more dramatic and unmanageable impact 
on society than opium. This is captured clearly in the 
reflections of a local administrator from Lashio about 
how the drug situation has changed from the time of his 
youth in the 1960s to the present day.
When we were young, opium was very important. 
The one who used opium was rich at that time. 
Relatives and friends always asked how much 
opium do you have? If we had a lot, it meant we 
were rich. In the past, people who used drugs went 
to bed late but got up early to get to work and did 
well […] They could work in the field the whole day 
without resting, if they got enough opium. To use 
WY [methamphetamine] is easier than opium… 
People used to pay 5,000 kyats for a pill. Only  
some people used it. But now, 500 kyats gets  
three pills, so everyone can afford to buy it.  
There are more drug addicts now. Some drug 
addicts were sent away to escape from this  
kind of environment. Some were sent away for  
more than 10 years but when they got back home, 
they used it again. Before, drugs were only in 
downtown but now you can find them in every 
village and town. (Local administrator, Lashio, 
northern Shan State, 2018)
Poppy fields along the China border, 
northern Kachin State, Myanmar. Photo by KRC.
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These sentiments were also common throughout 
Kachin State, shown in the following testimony from  
an elderly man in Chipwi.
In the past, though the opium users used opium 
they still worked, the opium use even helped them 
to do more work. But now we see drug users 
injecting drugs. Since needles and syringes are 
easily available, kids start using drugs […] Different 
types of drug are flooding into Chipwi area, and  
in the future, I foresee that the drug addiction 
problem will be even worse. (Elderly resident,  
Chipwi, northeast Kachin State, 2018)
These changing patterns of drug use have become 
an important, albeit often overlooked, dimension of 
the poverty and vulnerability experienced by many 
households across Kachin State and Shan State. 
Approximately one in three people in these states  
live below the national poverty line.59 The material, 
physical and emotional impacts of harmful drug 
use have been significant for many families already 
struggling with poverty, and in ways that often have 
specific gendered dimensions. These include the  
extra costs that families incur because of drug use,  
as discussed by a woman in her thirties from Kengtung 
in eastern Shan State.
I’m the first of five siblings and the only  
woman. The rest are men. The brother after me 
took many drugs. My second brother injected  
heroin and became addicted. I asked my friend  
to send him to Loi Tai Leng [The headquarters  
of the Shan State Army/Restoration Council of  
Shan State]. We found out he has HIV and needs  
to take medicine… 
While my brothers were using drugs, my father 
and I were the only breadwinners. My two younger 
brothers were still in school. At that time, my  
two brothers who used drugs often stole property 
such as motorbikes. I had to pay compensation 
whenever my brothers stole from others. I only 
had a small salary. After I paid the compensation 
sometimes there was nothing to eat at my house. 
(Civil society organisation worker, Kengtung, eastern 
Shan State, 2019)
Drug use can also cause loss of income as family 
members become too incapacitated to work, wages 
are spent on drugs and/or because assets are sold to 
buy drugs. These issues are clearly illustrated in the 
following testimony from a woman in Namtu Township 
in northern Shan State.
Drugs destroyed our family, I really don’t like it, we 
will never be successful. Even if we have a car or 
valuable things, there will be nothing left. Even if 
we have just 1kg or 2kg of rice, he [my husband] 
exchanges it for drugs. He started [taking drugs] 
when our first son had just passed away, he was 
sad. His friends gave him drugs. He told me that if 
he used it, it could make him better. I told him not 
to use because we didn’t have money like other 
people. We have now been married for 14 or 15 
years but our lives haven’t improved… 
He went to the Loi army [Ta’ang National Liberation 
Army] to quit for one year. When he came back 
home, he was heavier and more handsome but after 
he went out with his friends, he used it again. When 
he tried to work, he got pains in his stomach, so he 
came back home and asked me for money for drugs 
and rested. He even pledged the title deed [for the 
house] for 60,000 kyats. He did work at the farm 
for 15 days but only gave 300 kyats [US$ 0.20] for 
his daughter. I want him to be a good person and 
work like other people and improve our family, but 
he doesn’t. (Farmer, Namtu Township, northern Shan 
State, 2018)
A Kachin farmer from Mogaung Township also 
discussed how drug use can erode family relationships 
and undermine the support networks that are important 
for households going through tough times, in the 
following testimony.
It has been 20 years I have been using opium. I was 
18 years old that time. I started using heroin four 
or five years ago. I got married when I was 36 years 
old. My wife put up with me for some time when she 
knew that I was a drug addict. I had two children 
with her. When we were newly married I stopped 
using for a while. But the situation got worse. I 
have been to rehab centres in Yangon. I also went 
to rehab centres in the KIO-controlled area. But my 
family just splintered… 
Since I became a drug addict my wife left for a 
foreign country. My children are now living with my 
paternal aunt…So my life became meaningless. 
After that I started using heroin again. I leased our 
cow and with the money I used drugs. My siblings 
also said that as long as I am a drug addict they will 
no longer accept me. I only have my aunt caring 
for me. She is the one looking after my children. 
She is living on government pension. In the past 
I was quite depressed and would even think of 
committing suicide. (Farmer, Mogaung Township, 
Kachin State, 2018)
Worsening levels of drug use are also perceived to  
have undermined community solidarity and mutual 
support mechanisms that in the past assisted 
households during times of need or in managing the 
costs of certain events such as weddings and funerals. 
A Pa-O civil society organisation leader described  
this situation in the interview that follows.
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All villages have their own rules, you know, rules 
to follow. In my village all young people must do 
social service in the community. If you are 16 or 
finished school you have to automatically become a 
member of the village social work group. So in that 
group we have rules, and if you do not follow the 
rules we won’t help you… 
If you get married we are not going to help you, for 
your wedding, something like that. These rules also 
try to stop young people using drugs. According 
to that rule, if you use drugs you have to leave the 
village [...] They try to control the situation like this. 
But now the situation is very difficult to control. In 
some villages most of the young people use drugs. 
We have the rule but the rule is broken. (Civil society 
organisation leader, Taungyyi Township, southern 
Shan State, 2018)
Harmful drug use had been seen as an issue confined 
to sectors of the population in certain risk areas, for 
example, male labourers in mining areas. But people 
now perceive it as a part of everyday life affecting a wide 
cross-section of society, including women and children. 
This was a common narrative in countless interviews. 
The comments made by a community leader from  
Mong Pan in southern Shan State illustrate this.
Nowadays, yaba can be found everywhere.  
Before the price of a pill of yaba here was 1,800 
kyats. Now, three or four pills can be bought with 
1,000 kyats. Normally, a poor student would have 
pocket money of between 200 and 500 kyats while 
those from a wealthy family may have something 
between 500 and 1,000 kyats. The son of a teacher 
from 8th grade became addicted and his parents 
have been so heartbroken because of it. That boy 
explained that he became a drug addict because 
he could buy a pill of yaba with just 200 kyats. 
(Community leader, Mong Pan Township, southern 
Shan State, 2018)
These testimonies offer insights into how drug  
use has become an important dimension of  
poverty and vulnerability across Kachin and Shan 
State. Thus, interventions aimed at alleviating  
poverty and livelihood insecurity need to pay greater 
attention to the impact of drug use. This creates 
challenges and the need for nuanced responses. 
In many upland regions, opium cultivation remains 
essential to the livelihood strategies of many poor 
households. At the same time, rising levels of drug  
use, especially heroin and methamphetamines,  
have placed severe pressures on families and 
communities. 
3.  Young people have become particularly vulnerable to drug-related 
harms in Myanmar’s borderlands
The impact of drug use on young people60 is a  
particular concern throughout Shan and Kachin State. 
Although hard to quantify, there is a strong sense  
that young people are disproportionately impacted  
by drugs and that this will have a significant and 
damaging impact on society for years to come.  
Drug use amongst children (sometimes as young 
as eleven or twelve) and young adults is commonly 
attributed to a combination of naivety, low levels  
of education and a lack of knowledge about drugs,  
and absence of family oversight. 
This is especially true if children have to travel to  
school, are studying at university, or if their parents  
have migrated to work. Moreover, peer pressure  
(mostly amongst young men) and ‘youth’s nature’ of 
wanting to explore and try new things plays a big role. 
All of these factors are present in an environment  
where drugs are cheap and easy to access. A Burmese 
man in his twenties from Taunggyi captured some of 
these issues, echoing the experiences of many other 
young people we interviewed. Poppy farm in Chipwi Township, Kachin State (KRC).
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I was 20, and a tenth standard student, when I 
started using opium. It is youth’s nature to want 
to try anything. And like cigarettes and alcohol, it 
was within reach. It has lasted now for eight years. 
I drank it mixed with cough syrup. It was known as 
‘Formula’. At first, it was only once in a while. Later I 
began to use it every day… 
The feeling was strong and made me feel dizzy at 
first. But it was still pleasant, unlike getting drunk 
with alcohol. As it went on, it became a burden 
economically and socially. So I decided to quit.  
For the first week, I was delirious. When I went to 
the private clinic the detox medication there wasn’t 
strong enough. So I went back using. Then I went 
to a different clinic. Still, I went back to using drugs 
again. (Resident of Taunggyi Township, southern 
Shan State, 2018)
Many interviews draw attention to the ease with which 
young people can access drugs, compared to the difficulty 
of accessing support. This is especially true outside of 
major cities like Taunggyi, where access to treatment is 
very limited. Families’ desperation, coupled with the lack 
of education and services, has exposed young people 
to further harms. A worker at a drug treatment centre in 
Tachilek described the situation of some patients arriving 
from rural areas in the following interview.
Their addiction was so serious that in some of the 
cases, their parents would tie them up before they 
could seek […] help from the authorities, whom they 
have no idea where and how to approach. Finally, 
they found their way to us and got the patient 
admitted to our rehabilitation centre. Once they get 
here, you could even see the infections from the 
wounds that they got from being tied around wrists 
and hands. (Drug treatment centre worker, Tachiliek, 
eastern Shan State, 2019)
Schools and universities have become common sites for 
drug use, which has magnified associated harms among 
young people in particular. In the following testimony, a 
man who started using heroin whilst studying at Monyin 
University described the drug situation on campus. 
Drug use in the university campus became so 
serious around 2005. You would find used syringes 
and needles scattered around toilets and bushes  
at the back of the university campus. You see the 
rear side of the campus…
Heroin is freely available, but not always. Some days 
you will find a crowd assembled there. The campus 
has become a favourite spot for drug dealers as 
well. Some dealers came to sell by motorbike from 
a far place. They put heroin in a plastic straw. 
You can get it for 1,000 or 2,000 kyats. (Monyin 
University alumni, Kachin State, 2018.)
Young people from rural areas often travel long 
distances each day to attend school and university 
or live in boarding houses during term time. This has 
become increasingly common since the ceasefires, as 
declining levels of armed conflict improved mobility. 
As a result, more young people were able to access 
education, but also experienced greater exposure to 
illicit drugs. This is just one of a number of reasons  
why people express frustration and resentment about 
the legacy of the ceasefires.
Drug use amongst young people is often attributed 
to their inability to control themselves, to overcome 
temptation, or to act responsibly. These narratives 
commonly have strong religious connotations, and 
are also often internalised by those who use drugs 
and blame their addiction on their own perceived 
weaknesses, or a weakness they believe they have 
inherited. A Shan man in his twenties offered insights 
into attitudes surrounding drugs. 
I started using ‘Formula’ in 2010. I wasn’t 
successful in my work, I despaired and wanted  
to forget everything. Alcohol failed to help me.  
Then a new friend said, ‘Try this’, and I did. My 
parents brought a doctor to do a check-up. And  
he informed them that I had become a ‘junkie’… 
So I tried to quit by locking and tying myself up  
in my room. How many times have I tried to quit,  
but every time I return to ‘Formula’. You may hate 
her but you never forget her […] My present work  
is indoor electric wiring… 
When working, I only use a small amount. My 
employer, looking at my complexion, knows what  
I am and pays me less than normal. I don’t like it,  
but I can’t complain. I know I can quit, if I only have 
the strength. I read a lot of religious books. Still 
I can’t make myself quit. (Resident of Taunggyi, 
southern Shan State, 2018)
However, people’s testimonies also emphasise the  
need to understand the wider social, political and 
economic factors that have created an environment  
in which young people are particularly vulnerable to 
drug-related harms. They draw attention, for example, 
to how young people use drugs – and alcohol – as 
a coping mechanism, in response to the pressures 
they face. This is particularly true in a society 
where opportunities do not match aspirations and 
expectations. The reflections of a youth worker in 
Taunggyi are instructive in this regard. 
Most of the young people who graduated from 
university don’t have job opportunities. They just 
go back home. In my community if you already 
graduated parents believe that you can get a job 
with the government, a company or with an NGO.  
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If you continue your education in university the cost 
is very high. But if you go back and do nothing after 
you graduated people will pressure you… 
They say: ‘You already graduated so why don’t 
you do something like other people?’ ‘Why did we 
educate them because after they graduated, they 
are going to work like us?’ It’s a lot of pressure 
for young people. And also even if you finished 
university we don’t have any skill for our lives. 
Education is not very good [...] This is a lot of 
pressure for young people. So some, they use 
drugs, some also alcohol. (Youth worker, Taunggyi, 
southern Shan State, 2019)
This view was also echoed in the following testimony  
of a Kachin pastor from Monyin.
Young people do not have job opportunities. They 
have fewer opportunities to work outside the 
Church and even the Church can’t offer many job 
opportunities. Look at Monyin, there is only one 
bank. You cannot find Kachin staff working there. 
And there are no job opportunities for Kachin youth 
in the government sector… 
Therefore, many young Kachin people turn to drugs. 
Drug use became more serious here after 2013 
when the jade mining was accessible for a short 
period for the general public, and Monyin became a 
busy town. Young people could work in the mining 
sector for a short period and with it many young 
people turned to drugs. (Kachin pastor, Monyin, 
Kachin State, 2018)
The testimonies collected during our research 
demonstrate that young people face a double 
vulnerability: they are vulnerable both to the physical 
and social harms caused by drug use; and they are 
vulnerable to the harms caused by some of the 
responses to drugs. These include punishment-based 
responses and the stigma associated with drug use, 
both of which often prevent people from seeking help. 
This presents a particular challenge for female drug 
users who remain a largely ‘hidden population’. This is 
due to the lack of services for women and the greater 
stigma attached to female drug use. A woman in her 
early twenties, interviewed in Taunggyi, offered her 
reflections on how drug use has impacted her life in the 
following testimony.
I started using ‘Formula’ when I was 19, in second 
year of university. My mother died and my father 
remarried. My stepmother and I were not so much 
different in age. I quarrelled with [my father] and 
refused to return home even on the holidays. Then 
my boyfriend said, ‘Here’s the cure for your blues. 
Drink it!’, and I did. I became hooked. He was caught 
one and a half years ago and is in jail… 
Then I had to start buying the drug myself. I thought 
about quitting. But, as a woman, it’s difficult to 
get treatment at a hospital. And I don’t trust the 
hospital. One of my friends got treatment and when 
he went back home was arrested. I tried quitting 
by myself. I suffered so much I felt like dying, 
getting almost crazy. People are also avoiding 
me, especially after the arrest of my boyfriend. 
Eight months after, I visited my boyfriend. He was 
sentenced to 15 years. He wept and I wept. His 
family wasn’t happy with me; they blamed me for 
their son’s plight. (Taunggyi resident, southern Shan 
State, 2018)
Drug use site in a graveyard in Tachiliek, Shan State, Myanmar. Photo by SHAN.
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This report has sought to provide a fine-grained 
understanding of illicit drug economies by engaging 
with the everyday lives and local perspectives of 
borderland communities in Afghanistan, Colombia  
and Myanmar. 
While each country, and each borderland, has a  
unique history and experience of illicit drug economies, 
violence and development, to the extent possible,  
we have drawn out some of the differences and 
similarities across the cases. Future work will  
seek to develop a more systematic set of  
comparative insights.
Below we reflect on some of the key messages  
that emerge from this engagement with the  
borderlands and their implications in relation to  
war-to-peace transitions, illicit economies and 
processes of development, and the role of drugs  
in the everyday lives of borderland communities.
War-to-peace transitions 
There are deeply contextualised relationship between 
drugs, war, violence and peace. These relationships often 
manifest themselves very differently in the borderlands 
than at the national level. But a very strong message 
coming from the borderlands is that chronic and deadly 
violence is a daily reality and a huge obstacle to human 
flourishing. For policymakers, targeting these different 
forms of violence must be an urgent priority. Otherwise 
the escape routes out of a reliance on illicit economies 
will remain blocked for borderland communities.
The violence of peace 
The voices from the borderlands raise troubling 
questions about what kind of peace is brought about 
through negotiated settlements and who is peace for? 
Peace agreements and ceasefires may address one 
form of violence, but unleash others – especially in 
borderland regions. 
A recurring narrative from all our borderland research 
sites is the failure of peace processes to address  
the needs and aspirations of borderland communities. 
The everyday realities of ‘peace’ in the borderlands  
are often chronic insecurity, precarious livelihoods  
and a distant and often arbitrary state – conditions  
that push communities into a closer relationship  
with illicit economies. 
Far from experiencing a smooth transition from  
‘war’ to ‘peace’, in many places violence and  
instability increased and illicit activities expanded 
following ceasefires and/or peace agreements. 
New forms of violence 
Borderland communities referred to, and  
experienced, a wide range of forms of individual  
and collective violence. 
On guard after burning a coca laboratory near Tumaco, Colombia. Photo by AP Photo/William Fernando Martinez.
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These include continued large-scale violence involving 
government forces and armed rebels in northern 
Myanmar and Nangarhar province in Afghanistan; the 
violence associated with counter-narcotics policies 
and interventions, including the spraying and forced 
eradication of coca in Colombia; the bombing of drugs 
labs in Afghanistan, and interdiction efforts on the 
Nimroz border so that smuggling networks become 
increasingly militarised; the ‘slow violence’ linked to 
exploitative labour practices and extensive drug  
(ab)use in Shan and Kachin States; or the use or threat 
of coercion in order to close, police and manage borders. 
In many cases, these heterogeneous but intermingled 
forms of violence are occurring simultaneously, creating 
forms of insecurity that are unpredictable and make it 
difficult for borderland communities to plan and invest 
in their futures. At the same time, those living in the 
borderlands are ‘agents’ as well as ‘victims’ of violence, 
taking up arms on behalf of, or to resist the state, to gain 
a livelihood, to enrich themselves, to seek revenge or to 
protect their family and community. 
Which violence counts
Interviews frequently reveal a disjuncture between 
international/national and borderland narratives about 
violence. For example, the former typically focus on 
anti-state violence as the most salient and existential 
threat, while the latter often highlight violence linked to 
counter-narcotics policies meted out by state or para-
state forces, or the slow violence linked to drug use. 
Although violence is an everyday reality in the 
borderlands, and violent events are the defining 
moments and reference points in people’s lives,  
these do not map neatly onto external or national 
accounts of the conflict. 
Perhaps surprisingly, some borderland inhabitants  
in Putumayo and Nangarhar talked about life being 
more secure during ‘wartime’ when the FARC and 
the Taliban (respectively) were in control of their 
borderlands. And subsequently, they reflected on  
how life had become less secure because there  
were now more wielders of violence and the rules  
of the game were far more uncertain. This is a sharp 
reminder that some forms of violence are more  
visible than others, and count as being more important 
because of who or what they threaten.
Mutating violence 
Thus, peace processes and post-war transitions may 
mutate or displace violence out into the state margins. 
National-level stability, increasing economic integration 
and state presence can bring new forms of violence 
and exploitation and dismantle some of the coping 
mechanisms established during wartime. 
Meanwhile, licit economies may be no less violent  
than illicit activities. For example, jade mining in  
Kachin state and the oil industry in Putumayo have  
been associated with very high levels of physical  
and structural violence.
Puerto Asís, Colombia. Photo by Frances Thomson/Universidad Nacional de Colombia.
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Borderland development 
The relationship between illicit drugs and development 
processes is neither fixed nor straightforward. It  
varies at different points in the value chain, as shown  
by the experiences of those involved in production, 
trading and consumption. It also shifts over time, 
as drug economies themselves change and mutate, 
altering the distribution of costs and benefits for 
borderland communities. 
There is a need to think more carefully 
about how to mitigate the harms  
caused by external interventions and  
to ensure these harms are not borne  
by the most vulnerable.
Notwithstanding the complexities of the drugs-
development nexus, the fact that drugs can contribute 
to processes of development, raises significant 
questions for development actors who see poverty 
alleviation and reducing illegal drug production as 
mutually reinforcing policy goals. Counter-narcotic 
programmes may perversely lead to ‘policy-induced 
poverty’. Therefore, there is a need to think more 
carefully about how to mitigate the harms caused by 
external interventions and to ensure these harms are 
not borne by the most vulnerable.
Drugs driving development 
While drugs are typically framed as a development 
‘problem’ driving armed conflict, the voices in this  
report present a more complex picture.
In frontier boom towns in Afghanistan  
and Myanmar, drugs have provided  
the start-up capital for investment  
in other enterprises, which in turn act  
as a magnet for inward investment.
We have seen how in Colombia, coca growing,  
picking and processing have allowed marginalised 
populations to secure livelihoods and send children  
to school or university, or to access healthcare.  
The coca economy has also enabled communities  
to invest in basic infrastructure, such as roads or 
schools. that the state is not providing. In frontier  
boom towns in Afghanistan and Myanmar, drugs  
have provided the start-up capital for investment  
in other enterprises, which in turn act as a magnet  
for inward investment. 
Conversely, the revenue from drugs may flow in  
the opposite direction, acting as an engine of growth  
at the centre, fuelling property market booms in  
capital cities and getting laundered into the banking 
sector and/or licit businesses.
Rather than being a source of poverty and insecurity, 
drug economies can often become an important  
lifeline and safety net for marginalised populations.  
In effect they are the alternative development.
Development driving drug production  
and use
This relationship works both ways. Drug economies 
may stimulate development, as shown above,  
but they can also be a response to processes  
of development. Economic development does not  
always dismantle illicit drug economies; for example,  
it can generate forms of marginality that push  
excluded groups into the production, trafficking  
or consumption of drugs.
We saw this through the voices in northern  
Myanmar, where increased mobility and connectivity, 
expanding cross-border trade and improved security  
all served to enable the extension of drug networks  
into new areas. 
Drug use may often be a coping mechanism for dealing 
with the rapid political, economic and social change 
brought about by development. In the Myanmar-China 
borderlands massive inflows of capital have resulted 
in the emergence of frontier boom towns. These have 
been associated with processes of dispossession and 
displacement; the replacement of subsistence farming 
with large-scale agro-industry, and the emergence of 
new forms of employment. 
The latter are often arduous jobs such as in mining  
and logging in remote places away from families.  
These developments have all been associated with  
rises in drug consumption. 
The distributive impacts of drug economies
This complex relationship between drugs and 
development caution against simplistic narratives  
of drugs as ‘good’ or ‘bad’ for development and  
poverty alleviation. Instead, we need to focus  
our analysis on the distributive impacts of drug 
economies, asking: Who benefits and who loses?  
Of course, the answer to this question is highly  
context- and time-specific. 
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Drugs and everyday lives
Drug economies are deeply embedded in the everyday 
lives of the people in borderland regions. Rather than 
being helpless victims, in many cases, drugs give 
borderlanders agency and are an important social safety 
net. Nevertheless, this does have serious trade-offs, 
increased risk and violence being the most pervasive. 
For policymakers this implies bringing a borderland 
perspective into thinking and practice, and developing 
approaches that are more granular and work with the 
grain of local institutions and social structures. 
It also means taking seriously the agency and voice 
of borderland communities; building alliances with 
groups that represent marginal actors, and supporting 
participatory processes. And, as a minimum, 
policymakers need to be aware of the difficult trade-
offs that people face and ensure their policies and 
programmes do not make them even tougher or 
impossible for borderland communities to manage. 
Contextualising drug economies 
In the borderlands we study, licit and illicit commodities 
and substances are entangled with one another and 
local notions of licit and illicit may differ from state-
based definitions. In Colombia for example, cocaleros 
(‘coca growers’) are adamant about calling themselves 
campesinos (‘peasant farmers’). This challenges 
perceptions that they are rich narco criminals.  
In fact, many are farmers who cultivate several crops,  
of which coca plants, albeit slightly more profitable  
are just one. 
Similarly, Afghan traders smuggle opium and heroin 
alongside cigarettes, fuel and other goods across  
the Afghan-Iran border. 
This intermingling of licit and illicit commodities does 
not involve sharp normative or legal distinctions from 
the trader’s point of view. This is not to deny that 
illegality brings specific risks (as well as opportunities). 
These include for example the potential for violence, 
sudden loss of income due to crop eradication for the 
farmer, or the risk of imprisonment or the need to pay 
large bribes faced by the smuggler. 
Drug economies in these regions also have long 
histories, involving repeated cycles of ‘war’ and ‘peace’, 
shifts in the distribution of drug cultivation, trafficking 
and use within the borderlands, and new innovations 
and technological change related to drug production 
and new substances. 
Given the extended timeframes of armed conflict and 
drug production (in all three countries, at least three to 
four decades), we can see significant inter-generational 
shifts in perceptions around, and engagement with, 
drug economies. 
For example, in Colombia, interviews revealed inter-
generational learning in terms of changing patterns 
of investment of the proceeds of drug economies. 
Current coca growers talked about how they no longer 
engaged in conspicuous consumption, as the previous 
generation had, but instead invested their income 
carefully in their children’s education, healthcare and 
household necessities. 
In Myanmar, older generations reflect on the importance 
of poppy cultivation as a livelihood strategy, and opium 
use as social and recreational activity. In contrast, 
younger generations emphasise the destructive force 
of rising drug use, undermining the human and social 
capital of the borderlands. 
Therefore, understanding today’s drug economies 
requires being attuned to how they are imbued with 
different meanings and practices according to the 
experiences of successive generations of people  
in the borderlands. 
Drug economies in these regions also have 
long histories, involving repeated cycles of 
‘war’ and ‘peace’, shifts in the distribution of 
drug cultivation, trafficking and use within 
the borderlands, and new innovations 
and technological change related to drug 
production and new substances. 
Agency and social mobilisation
Communities involved in drug economies are frequently 
represented as victims who are forced, through necessity 
or outright coercion, to participate. Yet our fieldwork 
shows that farmers, traders and consumers all assert, 
and in many cases, enhance their agency through their 
engagement in drug economies.
In Colombia, profits from the coca plant have led 
to the construction of public goods and communal 
infrastructure through shared labour. In Afghanistan, 
traders based in Nimroz, bordering Iran, organised  
to negotiate tax concessions and security with the 
Taliban, to ensure trading routes remained open. 
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Other forms of social mobilisation have taken the 
form of resistance to drugs bans. For example, tribal 
networks in Afghanistan’s Nangahar province repeatedly 
mobilised against international, government and Taliban 
drug bans. Similarly, cocaleros unions in Colombia’s 
northern region led collective resistance against  
bans on drug production. These forms of resistance  
of otherwise marginal communities is emblematic 
of the agency of borderland communities who often 
see drug economies as a way of renegotiating and 
challenging their marginality. 
Yet, local communities, as well as exercising agency  
in defence of their right to cultivate drug crops, also 
mobilise in response to drug consumption and the  
so-called ‘evil of addiction’. Pat Jasan, Myanmar’s  
best-known anti-drug organisation, is an example  
of how grassroots mobilisation against drugs can 
become entangled in broader ethno-nationalist anxieties 
about the ‘corrupting’ influence of the central state.61
Trade-offs and ambiguities 
The war on drugs and its operationalisation through 
counter-narcotics policies and programmes attempts  
to draw clear ‘battle lines’ and sharp distinctions 
between the legal and illegal, state and non-state, 
‘narcos’ and citizens. Yet the voices from the 
borderlands reveal the ambiguities, fuzzy boundaries 
and trade-offs surrounding people’s everyday 
involvement in illicit drug economies.
There are many disjunctures between the external, 
official narratives and the daily lived experiences of 
borderlanders. Presented from the outside as a war 
against drugs, for those on the receiving end it is  
often seen as a ‘war against people’. Drug policies 
and legal frameworks prioritise punishment and 
confrontation. But at the same time, drug economies 
perform the role of a ‘safety net’, substituting for  
many of the developmental and welfare provision  
roles that the states are unable or unwilling to perform 
in borderland regions.
Moral condemnation of drugs as ‘evil’ and the 
stigmatisation of those involved, sits alongside  
the reality of drugs as the only mechanism for  
(modest) empowerment in environments where  
legal markets can deliver few benefits to those  
on the margins.
Notwithstanding the numerous welfare and 
developmental roles that illicit drug economies  
have come to perform for borderland communities,  
this does not mean they necessarily provide an  
escape route from, or antidote to the ‘pathologies  
of the margins’. 
Engagement with drug economies comes with major 
risks and trade-offs. Small-scale farmers and traders 
particularly, are locked in a Faustian pact. Drugs 
cultivation and trading can smooth over subsistence 
crises and provide short-term incomes. But this comes 
with major risks linked to violence, eradication or 
interdiction. Those involved lack any legal mechanisms 
to mediate disputes, make claims on the state or 
to protect themselves from predatory behaviour. In 
many respects drug economies enable borderland 
communities to cope and survive, but not to transform 
the structures that keep them marginal.
Moral condemnation of drugs as ‘evil’  
and the stigmatisation of those involved, 
sits alongside the reality of drugs as 
the only mechanism for (modest) 
empowerment in environments where 
legal markets can deliver few benefits  
to those on the margins.
In moving forward on this project, a key challenge will  
be to identify and find ways of addressing these ‘drivers 
of marginality’ that prevent borderland communities 
from flourishing and force them into a closer embrace 
with illicit drug economies.
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  Drug economies cannot be tackled primarily as a crime and security 
issue. They must be treated as a long-term development issue.
  Illicit drug economies challenge conventional ways of thinking about 
development and state fragility.
  There is no stable, fixed relationship between drugs and development;  
it is two-way, contextual and often counter-intuitive. Illicit economies 
may contribute to development, and development may push people  
into illicit economies. 
  Efforts to counter drugs may undermine progress towards the 
Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). 
 
  Ceasefires and peace agreements can expose borderland populations to 
new and different forms of violence. These need to be better understood.
  Drugs revenues can fund the pursuit of ‘war’ and ‘peace’, order  
and disorder. 
  Counter-narcotic interventions can exacerbate and escalate violent 
conflict. This is often worst in borderland regions.
  Sustainable post-war transitions that address illicit economies  
require priority to be given to reducing violence and building peace  
in borderland regions.
  In order to bring about sustainable post-war transitions in  
drug-affected borderlands, there is a need to prioritise violence  
reduction and peacebuilding.
  To be effective, peace processes need to incorporate analysis of illicit 
economies, and make provisions for addressing them.
 
  Getting beyond the drugs, development and peacebuilding impasse 
means recognising the tensions in pursuing these different goals;  
trade-offs are unavoidable. 
  All policies create winners and losers. Being conscious of who the  
losers are is crucial in ensuring that the most vulnerable do not bear  
the primary costs of policies.
  People involved in illicit economies have to make day-to-day trade-offs 
to survive. Avoid policies and programmes that make these trade-offs 
impossible to manage. 
Policy implications
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  It may not be possible to design interventions that ‘do no harm’.  
A more realistic approach involves mitigating harms and avoiding  
policy-induced violence and poverty.
  Focus less on eradicating drug economies, and more on mitigating  
the harms experienced by the most vulnerable. 
  Mitigate the harms caused by drugs, development and stabilisation 
efforts in borderland regions by explicitly monitoring their effects  
on security, livelihoods and health.
 
  Actively engage with borderland perspectives, to better understand  
and address the factors that generate engagement in illicit economies. 
  Use participatory approaches and political economy frameworks  
to develop strategies to promote the interests of marginal groups  
and overcome the silences.
  Build alliances and partnerships with social and political groupings  
that represent or are composed of marginal groups, including those 
engaged in illicit economies.
  Question and counter the stigmatisation and stereotypes surrounding 
borderland communities involved in illicit economies.
  Integrate regional perspectives and ways of working into analysis  
and programming. 
 
  Think and act with a long term, inter-generational perspective, 
recognising how drug economies shift over time and have different 
effects on people of different ages.
  Build inclusion into all dimensions of borderland programming;  






Promote drug- and 
conflict-sensitive	
development in  
borderland regions
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